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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM ',FOR STUDY
I. INTRODUCTION 
After centuries of struggle the world has reached a point 
where representative governments are firmly established as 
functioning governmental bodies. There has emerged in this, era 
of the 20th century a host of nations whose highest levels of 
policy are formulated by democratic means, indicating that the 
people influenced by these governments are to large degree the 
influential and in the last resort sovereign. The people then, 
not the "prince” maintain the attributes of sovereignty. Accord- 
to J. S. Mill,
The meaning of representative government is that the 
whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise, 
through deputies periodically elected by themselves, the 
ultimate controlling power, which in every constitution 
must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they must 
possess in all its completeness; they must be masters, 
whenever they please, of all^ the operations of the govern­
ment . 1
In order for the people to be ''masters” of governmental 
operations there must have evolved along with the people’s 
control a method or procedure for governing the popular assem­
blies, "The evolution of the modern democratic process
■^John Stewart Mill, Considerations on Representative 
Government, (London: George~Tlout ledge and Sons), PV 821
2
is fused to the development of parliamentary procedure,
. (as a systematic method for giving each man or his representa­
tive a voice in establishing the law."^
Thus governing bodies, deliberative assemblies, world 
law-making organizations, must themselves first be governed 
by laws. Democratic bodies from the United Nations to the 
League of Women Voters as a first act of organization usually 
construct a set of laws that they must abide by in everyday 
functioning in order that they insure their internal order. 
The.laws that are self imposed upon any organization rep­
resent the basis upon which the laws of direct consequence 
to the people are inacted. But organizational laws go 
deeper yet; without them there could be no adequate way of 
insuring any form of deliberative order. As a realization 
of this we can trace back in time a succession of organizat­
ional procedure that has often been the key to the degree of 
effectiveness to which bodies have functioned. Indeed, 
parliamentary procedure and democracy invariably accompany 
each other. From the earliest origins of the British 
Parliament, the growth of representative government has been 
marked by an ever increasing system of formal procedure that 
has imposed order on the actions of parliament in direct 
ratio to the freedom to handle its own affairs were won
O Dwight Allen, "Parliamentary Procedure", Social 
Education, Vol. XXI (November, 1957)> P» 303•
3
from the King.
The general philosophy of democratic government and
that of parliamentary procedure are the same. Sturgis has
said, "the philosophy of each is based on freedom of the
group and of the individual, on equality of opportunities
and responsibilities for all, and on the right of the
majority to decide."3 Gray goes further when he writes,
...the parliamentary form of government is based 
essentially on freedom of discussion, freedom of 
speech, freedom to evaluate, to critize, to 
protect, to act or to recind action. Further it is 
based on the recognition of the fact that no one 
member or group of members has the rights orrprivileges 
that may be denied any other member or group of members, 
and that minorities have privileges as great as the 
majorities
Sturgis states that,
Parliamentary law is concerned with the means by 
which beliefs and ideas are best translated into 
effective group action. It must provide orderly 
ways of the will of the majority. It must be clear, 
considerate, kind, fair* and it must effect the 
desired aims of the assembly. It must, in other 
words, be democratic.5
The rules of parliamentary procedure then, have evolved 
through history as a method of implementing and maintaining 
the Ideals of democratic society. The rules themselves are 
simply mechanical and could be considered useless without
^Alice F. Sturgis, Learning Parliamentary Procedure.
(New Yorks McGraw-Hill Co., 1953),~pT 21.
^Wilkenson Gray, "Philosophy of Parliamentary Law", 
Quarterly Journal of Speech. (October, 19^1), p. ^3?»
^Allce P. Sturgis, Sturgis Standard Code of Parliamentary 
Procedure. (Nevr York: McGraw-Hill" Co., 1950), p. 8.
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the required accompaniment of a democratic philosophy— a 
, philosophy that must be active in practice and spirit as 
well as name or the rules of procedure may become not tools 
to implement but rather tools to pervert the aims and ideals 
of democracy.
Perhaps there is no better example of the fate of a 
body that espoused democratic ideals and yet was unable to 
function because of a lack of procedure than the French 
National assembly at the time of the French Revolution.
A hundred members might be seen trying to address 
the House at the same time. The authority of the 
president was wholly disregarded. Spectators applauded 
or hissed at pleasure. No rules were observed in the 
conduct of business. Sir Samuel Romilly, deeply 
sympathetic, had prepared a statement of the practice 
of the House of Commons, and Mirabeau had translated 
it into French. It was ignored. Much of the violence 
which prevailed in the Assembly would have been allayed, 
and many rash measures unquestionably prevented, if 
their proceedings had been conducted with order and 
regularity.°
Thomas Jefferson, realizing the need for a body of 
rules for the new nation of America and probably aware of 
the debacle in the French Assembly, utilized the usages of 
the British Parliament to form the basis of procedure for 
the newly formed American Congress. It was as he said, 
ua sketch, which those who after me will successively 
correct and fill up, till a code of rules shall be formed for
^Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1922), p. 1.
the use of the Senate, the effects of which may be an 
accuracy of business, economy of time, order, uniformity, 
and impartiality,,Jefferson was right. His manual, has 
grown into volumes that serve as the basis of deliberation 
for the democratic assemblies of the world.
But on what plane do we view procedure? Luce has 
asked if, "parliamentary law be spoken of in the same 
breath with the Magna Carta, The Bill of Rights, the 
Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n c e ? ' ^  perhaps we can turn to 
Justice Frankfurter for the answer when he concluded,
"the history of liberty has largely been a history of 
observance of procedural s a f e g u a r d s ."9 Indeed, parliamentary 
procedure is the safeguard of the very essence of democracy 
where the will of the people is to be ascertained— a nd’ 
abided by. i
II. THE PROBLEM,‘\
The twofold purpose of this Study was to discover 
(1) a history of the quorum, and (2) a philosophy of the 
quorum, as shown by an examination of significant events 
that have occurred In American political history.
7rThomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice. 
(New York: Clark & Maynard, Pub. 1&73)» p. 6.
®Luce, op. clt.. p. 2.
9"The Revolution in Criminal Justice", Time. July 16, 
1965, p. 22.
The limitation to American political history is intended 
to keep the bounds of this study within a recognizable 
political framework. However, this study does deal with 
those events of significance concerning the quorum that
occurred in English history because it was in that nation
?
that the general rules of parliamentary law were started and 
developed into an organized system. America, as a nation 
whose cultural roots are primarily derived from England, 
has, accordingly, taken its basic system of rules of procedure 
directly from the English through colonial charters, Jefferson’ 
Manual of Legislative Procedure, the first body of rules for 
the U. S. Congress, etc.. Thus, it is reasonable that any 
study of American procedure should begin with a consider­
ation of the "Mother of Parliaments" for inceptions of those 
parliamentary devices which have been accepted by the United 
States decision-making groups.
Importance of study: America has been accused of being 
over-organizedl. That is, persons living in communities 
across the land represent a nation of joiners. As a nation, 
we organize in flower clubs, Parent-Teacher Associations, 
state and national houses of government. Since there are 
in the United States at least 2,000,OOO-^ organizations 
of various types, it becomes apparent that we tend to act 
in groups for the attainment of. our goals. One writer, Paul
  . &'
lOSturgis, op. bit., p. 4*
7.
Hoffman, has stated that America1 s voluntary organizations 
are the:VMgreatest phenomenon of American democracy.
It is in light of this phenomenon that the importance
of this study is to be found.
The American system of (private and governmental) 
group decision-making is based on the assumption that the 
individual is capable of self-government. To realize 
this assumption, minimum standards of representation must 
occur as part of the democratic process if the wish of the
individual is to be truly effective in this decision­
making process.
Since the quorum is an essential device of assuring 
adequate participation of the individual and thus assuring 
government of majority rule and minority protection, a 
knowledge of the history and philosophy of this central 
concept will contribute to our understanding of the demo­
cratic decision-making process. It is this very understand­
ing of the democratic process that may well aid in the pre­
servation of the individual’s right to participate in decisions 
that ultimately effect him.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In 1332, the English House of Commons established a 
new set of procedural rules in an attempt to handle more
^ Ibid., p. 21.
efficiently the ever-growing amount of business they were 
required to transact. The enactment of the new rules s 
signified more than a desire to streamline the working of 
the House; rather, the act reflected the need for effeciency 
to cope with the problems of increased trade, colonial 
management and perhaps, even more important, the enlargement 
and growing complexity of the functions of government.
The ideas of democracy were by this time well imbedded in 
England, as a new, growing and enfranchised middle class 
endeavored to enlarge their interests. It was one more 
act that reflected the changing structure of power in 
England as the King’s prerogatives became less and less 
dominant. The loss of dominance had taken much time: 
from the medieval parliament of the Estates in the thirteenth 
century to the nineteenth century.^
The Kings of the early medieval parliaments would on 
occasion, call together those persons whom they felt could 
offer them needful advice. In time, these persons became 
grouped as to their status, with the well-to-do on one side 
and the lesser merchants and landowners on the other.
Subsequently, a clerk was appointed to record the 
activities of the parliaments— as they were now called.
1 oFor a better understanding of the growth and devel­
opment of parliament see any of the numerous general history 
series, i.e.’, Charles Knight, History of England (New York: 
John Wurtele Lovell, l$Sl)
9
At first, the records were very scanty but expanded to - 
include records of proceedings and at times the speeches of 
the members. These records were entered into volumes that 
outlined the nature and forms which the parliaments fol­
lowed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries formal 
treatises on the nature of procedures during various eras 
were compiled by E l s y n g e , - ^  Hakewel,^ and others,.of the 
period.
■These treatises represent not only a record of ac­
tivities but are manifestations of the continually grow­
ing body of customary law. The growth of the parliament­
ary system showed signs of sophistication during this periods 
by the practice of electing members to the House, util­
ization of a committee system and an air of formality that 
became, part of the proceedings. The English parliament 
by the 17th century had emerged as a vital source and voice 
in the determining of public policy at an increasing degree 
to the exclusion of the King. Ilbert points out that 
"parliamentary procedure (at the end of the 17th century) 
followed the lines which it continued to retain until
^3Henry Elsynge, The Manner of Holding Parliaments in 
England, (London; 1765)
Hakewel, Modus Tenendi Parliamentum, (London,
1671)
10
after the Reform Act of 1^32.,?̂ 5
From the Long Parliament to 1&32, the most profound 
changes are often considered to be in the growth and devel­
opment of the cabinet in parliament and the emergence of 
the party system. Ilbert, commenting on the changes has 
stated:
They were silent changes, not brought about by any 
act of the Legislature; gradual in their operation; 
developed, modified, deflected, retarded by strong 
personalities', like Walpole, ■ Pitt, George III; imper­
fectly appreciated, misinterpreted, misunderstood.
In its way, the entire focus of parliamentary procedure 
was altered in the nineteenth century. The House came to 
recognize that the great task of self government— fthat 
excluded the one great power of the King— may well be deter­
mined by the very rules that it employs to direct itself.
The new procedure of the 19th century was constructed with 
the realization that perhaps the very continued exist­
ence of a parliament rests on the correct solution of the 
problems of procedure. The new dimension to procedure 
brought a'gout by party government, extensions of suffrage*;, 
a mighty empire and in time the introduction of deliberate 
obstructionism were such that procedure came to be recognized
"^Josef Redlich, The Procedure of the House of Commons, 
(London: Archibald Constable Co., IVUbj, p. 11.
l6Ibid., XI.
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as a single problem upon which the survival of the system
may well have depended.
If there is any one origin from which the greater part
of parliamentary law has developed, it could only be termed
usage. Indeed, there is a large body of practices that can
be traced to its origins; however, there is equally as great
a number of practices whose roots tend to evade us in the
light of a long passage of time. Of the rules that have
survived to the present day, Stubbs has said,
Many are in the same form as they appear in earliest 
parliamentary records. Others are less easily dis­
covered in the medieval chronicles and rolls, and 
owe their reputation for antiquity to the fact that, 
where they appear in later records, they have already 
assumed the dignity of immemorial custom.^?
Of the multitude of devices that constitute procedure,
there exists in the background of each some moment when
it became identified as part of accepted parliamentary
procedure,
Many usages were crystallized, so to speak, by the 
ruling of a speaker or by some formal action of 
parliament, such as a resolution or simple vote.
New situations were met in the same way. Thus, 
came what we call precedents. Out of these 
have been formulated much of what we call 
parliamentary law.^
Not all precedents have survived, even after formal 
adoption. Many have been dropped for extreme reasons.
-^William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England. 
(Oxford England: Clarendon Press, 1$73), P* 3$9, Vol. III.
lSLuce, op. cit., p. 13®
12
For instance, Hatsell, in what is considered to be the 
first compilation of precedents (Published 1776), rejects 
as precedents all the proceedings in both houses of parliament 
from January 4, 1641, (when the king, Charles I., went in 
person to the house of commons, for the purpose of arresting 
certain members), to the restoration.19
Although there is an aura of vagueness that is well 
contained around the early development of many aspects of 
procedure, modern parliamentary law is more concrete and 
in the 20th century its sources are well established. 
Specifically, modern parliamentary law is drawn mainly 
from five sources:
1. Decisions of bodies 011 appeal.
2. Decisions of presiding officers on points of 
order.
3. Decisions of courts.
4. Writings of authorities on parliamentary law.
5. Customs and u s a g e s . 20
If there is a key to the success of parliamentary law 
which has lasted hundreds of years, and shows no signs of 
growing old, it may well reside in the ability of the major 
legislative houses to adapt the technique of its practice 
and procedure to meet the demands and problems of each 
generation.
l9Luther Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of 
Legislative Assemblies, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1366), p. 3 0&.
20paul Mason, ĵ a son’s Manual of Legislative Procedure 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1953), p. 53. *
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Since parliamentary law is in a never ending state of 
flux it differs greatly from the practice of deliberative 
bodies of times past, both in America, and in England. 
Parliamentary law is not determined by the rules or practices 
in the House of Representatives of the United States, as 
it is often mistakenly thought. However, it should be 
noted that there is a difference in general structures of 
the procedure used in legislative bodies as constrasted with 
small private bodies.
Their special requirements (large legislative 
bodies) and the constantly increasing pressure of 
their business have produced highly complex and 
remarkably efficient systems peculiar to their 
respective bodies but which are as a whole unsuited 
to the needs of the ordinary assembly. As a result 
there has been simultaneously developed through 
years of experiment and practice a simpler system of 
procedure adapted to the wants of deliberative 
assemblies generally and which, though variously 
interpreted in minor details by different writers, 
is now in the main standardized and authoritatively established.21
IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Definitions of many terms which will be used repeatedly 
in this investigation are as follows-.
Parliamentary Law: Consists of the recognized rules,
precedents and usages of legislative, administrative, and 
service bodies by which their procedure is governed and 
determined. Parliamentary Law is an organized system of
^"Rules of Order'*, Encyclopaedia Britannlca. Vol. XIX.
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rules built on precedents and guided in its development
by the authority to make rules inherent in every deliberative
22or legislative body.
Parliamentary Procedure or Practices. The question is 
often asked as to the difference between parliamentary law 
and parliamentary procedure or practice. The many authors 
surveyed thus far acknowledge no difference and many use 
the words interchangeably. If any distinction should be 
made in this study it is to this extent: Parliamentary
law shall mean all the rules of procedure that have evolved 
through history and have been accepted as legitimate 
devices by having survived the tests of usage and the 
courts. Parliamentary procedure or practice should include 
these rules but should also include any and all rules that ' 
any given group— private or legislative— may utilize. Thus, 
rules that are particular to a given group, that may never 
have withstood a test b}*- the courts and yet are utilized 
would simply be considered rule or rules of parliamentary 
procedure or practice— but not necessarily parliamentary 
law.
Bodies, Groups or Assemblies. These refer to (1) 
those groups of people elected or appointed as the offi­
cial representatives of the people to function in a leg-
22 "Parliamentary Law”, ■■3ouvierts Law Dictionary*.-, 
Rawle*s.Revision Vol. IV.
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islative manner, and (2) those groups of people formed 
voluntarily for common interests, to reach a common goal 
or explore a common subject.
Quorum. Modern writers.:- on the subject of parliamentary 
law, seemingly without exception, take cognizance of the 
quorum as an extremely important aspect of procedure; as 
such, it is usually stated as a general rule, for adequate a 
and legal transactions of business. Since each organiza­
tion must determine its own quorum., it is rarely outlined 
in specifics in the manuals. The reason is quite obvious. 
Unlike many other features of procedure a quorum requirement 
cannot be stated in such a manner that would be binding on 
all organizations. Since no blanket quorum regulation is 
capable of filling the needs of all assemblies, it is 
regarded the duty of the persons constructing the organiza­
tion’s constitution to set the requirement in such a way 
that it will be realistic in light of the specific nature 
of the organization. Generally speaking, organizations 
having a fluctuating number of members will select a per­
centage as a quorum; those organizations with a fixed num­
ber usually specify a definite number as a quorum.
The important feature to note here is that few organ­
izations would elect to disregard the quorum. To the 
contrary, rare is the qroup that would choose to ignore such 
an important safeguard. The idea that some set number of
16
the whole body must be present before legal business can 
be transacted seems to be well imbedded in our procedure. 
However, there is much variation as to just what can or 
should constitute a quorum.
Much of the controversy that has been historically 
associated with the quorum can be traced to the problem 
of simply determining just what is meant by a quorum.
"From the very earliest times it has been recognized as a 
general rule that a majority of a group is necessary to act 
for the entire group."23 In the case of a public body, the 
power or authority which establishes the body may also 
determine what constitutes a quorum.24 Sturgis states that 
common parliamentary law fixes the quorum as a "majority of 
the m e m b e r s " . The constitution of the United States sets
j
the,qubrum requirement in the House of Representatives at 
a majority of the membership. But to state that a quorum 
is a majority of the membership opens the way to potential 
conflict; which, is precisely what has happened on numerous 
occasions. Many writers on the subject of procedure will go 
beyond this general definition and attempt a less restricted 
one— ignoring the majority limitation. The following are 
selected definitions from some of the better known texts on
2%ason, op. cit., p. 61.
2^Ibid.
25Sturgis, op. cit., p. 73-
17
procedure:
1* A quorum is the number of members required to be 
present to legally transact b u s i n e s s . 26
2. A quorum is the number of members required to be 
present at a meeting in order that the assembly 
may transact business. '
3. A quorum is the minimum, number of the members of 
an organization which must be present at a meeting 
in order to transact business l e g a l l y .  °
4. A quorum in an assembly is the minimum number that 
may be present to carry on business.29
In the above listed group of definitions there is no 
key given as how to determine what is a minimum number nor 
just what constitutes a majority. Is a majority the, (1) 
total membership list, including (2) associate members and, 
(3) including or excluding delinquent members? Is the 
majority computed on the basis of those (4) present and 
voting, or, (5) those present, voting and not voting, etc.?
These are the types of questions that have added to the 
confusion of the quorum concept as it has been utilized 
through history. As we have emerged into the modern era, it
26Joseph O ’Brien, Parliamentary Law for the Laymen,
(New York; Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952)", P* "28.
27\{envy M. Robert, Parliamentary Law, (New York: - 
Appreton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951h p. 356.
2^Sturgis, loc. cit.
29• F.M. Gregg, Handbook of Parliamentary Law,
(Boston; Ginn and Comparer, 1910), p. 68.
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is not surprising that by now the method, which has been 
legally agreed upon by the courts, to determine minimum and 
majority, is well established.
Quorum. For the purpose of this study, a quorum shall 
mean the rule of parliamentary law that requires some pre­
determined parts of the entire body to be present before 
business can be legally transacted.
Obstructionism. The act, on the part of any individual 
or group, of refusing to answer the quorum roll call, excepting 
those individuals who are physically unable to do so.
i.
;• .CHAPTER II
j i ' REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A considerable amount of material on the subject of 
parliamentary law has been written during the past several 
hundred years. Most of it can be classified as (1) those 
materials that codify precedents in manuals to be utilized 
in meetings of•various bodies to facilitate their business 
and, (2) "those publications that attempt to deal with 
procedure as it has grown and developed in various bodies. 
•Those of the second type may be commentaries on procedure, 
official or unofficial records of proceedings in various 
bodies such as the House of Commons or the United States 
Senate or House, or general history books that include 
procedure as a facet of history that mirrors the growth of 
government.
Of those books in the first instance, almost without 
exception, the treatment of the quorum is standard in that 
rules governing its use are outlined for meetings or forming 
constitutions. The differences in the consideration of its 
uses are only subject to change in light of the various 
dates of publication. Thus, a book on procedure which is
20
150 years old, i.e. Jefferson’s Manual,^ is less specific 
as to the number of conditions regarding the use of the. quorum 
than the Sturgis Code of Procedure, (1 9 5 1 ).2-- The comparison 
of the two indicates the vast change that has occurred in the 
development of the quorum during the intervening years.
The list of manuals on procedure is far too vast to 
allow a detailed examination of each. However, there are 
authors who require special mention since to some degree they 
look beyond a simple statement of what the quorum is and 
how it is utilized. Most writers have pointed out standard 
features of the quorum and go no further.
Since one of the purposes of this paper is to discover 
the historical growth of the quorum, reference will be made 
to those authors who deal with the historic aspect of the 
quorum. They are here presented in their historical 
occurrence, starting with the most recent.
1. ' Mason’s ManuaJ. of Legislative Procedure.3 Mason 
has divided the quorum into seven headings; each 
is an outgrowth of precedents as determined by
i1 : the better known manuals. For further support of 
the precedents, he lists the legal decisions that
Ijefferson, Op. cit., p. 26. 
^Sturgis, pp. cit,, p. 14. 
^Mason, dp. cit.
21
have occurred when any aspect of the quorum has 
!j . been challenged to a court decision and inter-
* i
pretation. His findings appear quite thorough 
so far as he has gone. The weakness in relation­
ship to this study is that no interpretation of 
the quorum is given outside of the strict reporting 
of the American legal cases— and these only by 
index number. This is not surprising considering 
the book is a manual for legislative bodies and 
makes no pretense at an historical analysis.
2. Sturgis Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure.4 
Sturgis uses the same pattern as Mason. Her 
approach is to outline the present day rules re­
garding the quorum and to refer each to one or 
several legal cases that have in some way deter­
mined the status of the quorum. Once again there 
is no concern or treatment of historical analysis.
3. Robert Luce, in his book. Legislative Procedure, 5 
devotes time to a discussion of the historical 
aspects of the quorum. He views the quorum in 
some detail as it progressed in this country in
^•Sturgis, bp. cit 
'’Luce, op. cit.
22
the New England, colonial and state legislatures. 
He even goes so far as to discuss briefly the 
guorum breaking rule of speaker Reed in the House 
of Representatives in 1&90. Too much of what 
Luce offers is simply a narrative of several 
incidents in American history, which although 
interesting, lacks necessary depth, philosophy 
or completion. In its totality, Luce’s writing 
does not come near the comprehensive study of the 
quorum that is needed--or does it claim to; 
Nevertheless, Luce has taken time to discuss the 
quorum outside the usual reiteration found in 
the manuals. His work was an aid in the reporting 
on the quorum in this paper; especially of value 
is his reporting on early American Legislatures.
4 . Luther Gushing in his work, Law and Practice of 
’ f)Legislative Assemblies, offers a discussion of] ' " - "
- the quorum in addition to stating quorum require­
ments of the period. His discussion is limited to 
a short survey of various constitutional requir- 
. ements for the quorum in many eastern states, 
and also the status of the quorum in the national 
houses. His discussion of the English Houses is 
only to mention the numbers required to constitute
6Cushing, pp. cit.
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a quorum of each. The Work is a hundred years 
old and is thus dated so far as recent developments 
of the quorum— and parliamentary practice in general 
are concerned.
In reviewing the literature of the second group, 
there was found a wealth of material on the general develop­
ment of both the English and American parliamentary govern­
ments. The Congressional Record and Globe are available for 
the American government and Journals of the Lords and Commons 
for the English government. Tn the case of those events 
that occurred in theae Houses before the start of their 
Journal publications, the collections of debates and 
proceedings are used.
Finally, there are several writers, who have dealt with 
the quorum problem as it occurred in the House of Representa­
tives in 1^90. This is not unique since what occurred 
culminated a problem that was centuries in building.
Further, any event that causes the House of Representatives 
to lose all sense of order and. decorum'would probably be ■
widely commented upon.
■ • '!
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CHAPTER XII
METHOD OF PROCEDURE.
The niethod of pr-ocedure used in the study of the quorum 
was the historical method.^
To accomplish the purpose of the study the following 
procedure was used:
I. Materials relevant to the topic were gathered and 
summarized according to the following categories: (1) origin 
and chronology of the.quorum, (2) obstructionism and the 
quorum, (3) modern American usages of the quorum.
II. These materials were utilized to establish a philos­
ophy of the quorum.
III. Chapter IV presents the findings from this study 
according to the following classification:
A. Origin and chronological development of the quorum
B. Obstructionism in the development of the quorum
C. Modern American usages of the quorum
D. Philosophy of the quorum, including basic premises of parliamentary law in relationship to the quorum
IV. Chapter V presents the following;
A. Summary of the findings of the study 
„ B. Recommendations for future usages of the quorum
C. Recommendations for further study
•^Ernest B. Bormann, Theory and Research in the Communic­
ative Arts. {New York: Holt1, Rinehart and Winston, I n c . 19^5).
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C. Recommendations for further study 
Statements about the materials are made in this study. 
These statements include judgments concerning human motives, 
conclusions deduced from historical data, and implications 
resulting from the various usages of the eruorum at different 
times by different bodies*
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS-
I HISTORY OF THE QUORUM 
Origin and Chronological Development; Often a phenomenon 
might in fact exist, but human failure to identify and acknowl 
edge that existence does not diminish nor obviate it. Such 
has been the case with the parliamentary concept of the quorum 
Long before attention was called to it, a form of the quorum 
existed in the early meetings of the king and his councilors 
in medieval England. In a sense, the quorum as an-element 
of parliamentary procedure, is almost as old as the parlia­
ment of England itself. Although not acknowledged as such 
by modern standards, either by name or purpose, a form of 
the quorum is evident as far back in English history as the 
reign of Henry II (1154-&9)* The "curia regis" or court of 
law of that period maintained that no one was indispensable 
to a court, "except its lord and such of his officials as 
are required to transact its business, "I 'Aiis fragmentary 
form of the quorum lasted but a short time as a result of the 
new power structure of the nobility, brought about by the
1A. F. Pollard, Tiie Evolution of. Parliament. (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd, 1926), p. 27.
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Magna Carta. This document of 1215 stated that the king 
when he held his court, "is not therefore bound to summon 
any particular persons to assist him.
As the king’s advisors took on a more independent role 
in the operations of government during the next two centuries, 
the status of the quorum concept becomes vague. The Modus 
Tenendi Parliamentum,3 one of the principle documents of 
early procedure, seemingly contradicts itself on the quorum 
concept. In the discussion on the degrees of the peers, 
the Modus points out that the parliament is composed of 
six degrees and that if any of the degrees, "below the King 
be absent, if they have been summoned by reasonable summonses 
of Parliament, the Parliament shall nevertheless be considered 
complete."^ The obvious implication is to the effect that 
business may proceed provided adequate notice be given no 
matter who attends. In later discussion, however, the Modus
Zibid.
3 The main problem here is simply the lack of accurate, 
extant records of the period. The Modus is one of the most 
complete documents cdncerning.'.'.procedure of the period but 
its validity is in question. The author is anonymous and 
it appears at various times in somewhat unusual circumstances, 
(Ibid., p. 433).
^Thomas D. Hardy (ed,), Modus Tenendi Parliamentum an 
Ancient Treatise on the Mode of Holding the Parliament in 
England (London: Eyre & Spottiswode), p. 24.
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spells out precisely what constitutes a quorum:
By this it is evident that the King can hold a 
Parliament with the commons of his kingdom without 
bishops, earls, and barons, provided they have been 
summoned to parliament, although no bishop, earl, nor 
baron obey the summons, because formerly there was 
neither bishop, nor earl, nor baron, yet the Kings 
held their Parliaments.5
The distinction here is clear; the newer social
classes of the earls, barons and bishops need not be present
for the legal transaction of business, provided the king
and his commons were present and the others simply notified.
The Modus goes on to explain why the commons must be
present and why the presence of the newer classes is not
needed for the proper transaction of business:
But still on the other hand, although the commons—  
the clergy and laity— are summoned to Parliament, 
as of right they ought to be, and for any cause will 
not come, as if they pretend that the Lord the King 
does not govern them as he ought, and assign special 
cases in which he has not. governed them, then there is 
no Parliament at all, even though the archbishops, and 
bishops, earls, and barons, and all their peers, be 
present with the King; and therefore it is needful that 
all things which ought to be affirmed or abrogated, 
granted or refused, or done by the Parliament ought to 
be done by the commons of the Parliament which is com­
posed of three degrees or orders of Parliament, to wit, 
of the procurators of the clergy, the knights of shires, 
commons of England, and not the nobles, because 
every one of them is in the Parliament for his own person 
and for none other.6
5Ibid., p. 42.
6Ibid.
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The commons then, composed by the clergy and laity, are of 
such importance to the king that they must be present for 
the proper transaction of business and thus constitute, 
what in latter terms would be called a quorum.
The development of the quorum as a stated rule of proced­
ure and given the name "quorum'1, is linked to the development ' 
of the office of the justice of the peace. In the year 
1327, Isabel, the wife of Edward II, contrived to depose her 
husband and set his son Edward III upon the throne of England.^ 
In an effort to avoid the possibility of a popular uprising 
and to maintain the peace, the new king ordered that "good'-7 
men...should be assigned to keep the peace."^ After the 
crises had passed, the office was retained and within twenty 
years, the additional power of trying felonies was given 
the "conservators, wardens, or keepers of the peace." An 
order, which appears as an effort to control the justices 
themselves, was enacted in the year 1344 and according to 0 
Cross, who stated, "any two or more were intrusted with 
limited judicial functions."9 The requirement of "any two 
or more" seems an outgrowth of liberties and abuses of power
7David Hume, The History of England, (Boston: Adline 
publishing Co., Vol. II), p. 154*
% i r  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, ed. W. G. Hammond (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whiteny 
Co., 1^90), ^ook I, p. 351
9Arthur L. Cross, A Shorter History of England and 
Greater Britain. (New York: MacMillan Co.’, 1929), p. 142
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taken by some of the conservators and that in an effort to 
discourage such activities, more than one justice was required 
for the proper transaction of business.
Under the circumstances, this requirement was apparently 
devised in an effort to have the justices keep check on 
one another. This restriction seems to have failed to bring 
about the end of power abuses as indicated by a statute 
enacted by Richard II which states, "that none shall be made 
justice of the peace for any gift, brocage, fauover, or 
affection....'i1®
To further keep men of dubious scruples from becoming 
justices it was enacted in statute Richard 12.C.10., that the 
justices, "be of the best reputation and most worthy men 
in the country."11
The parliamentry device of requiring more than one justice 
to be present for the legal transaction of business, was not 
called'the "quorum". This term was devised during the same 
period but in conjunction with another aspect to the office 
of justice of peace. The word "quorum was first used to 
name a select number of justices, known for their outstanding 
ability to be of the "quorum". The Eirenarcha by Lambard 
states'*
10William Lambard, Eirenarcha or The Office of the 
Justice of the Peace, in Two Books: Gathered in 1579 and 
published 15&1> p. 3 3 *
11Blackstone, Loc. cit.
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In the choice of the wardens and justices of 
the Peace, the Statute lawes have respecte to- the manners 
and ahilitie (or Livelihoode) of them all, and to the 
skill and learning of suche as are speciallie selected, 
and therefore named of the Quorum.I2
Despite the efforts of Richard II to keep the justices 
honest, it was apparently felt an attempt to upgrade the 
justice courts and to further check the unscrupulous justices, 
it was enacted during the reign of Henry VII (1457-1509) by 
statute II, c.2 s.5* "of the Justices of the peas whereof 
one shall be of the quorum."^3 Thus the quorum during this 
period referred to the membership of the select few justices 
who were appointed to that standing, and were mentioned in 
terms that denoted their status: "againe, Justices of the
Peace (especiallye those of the Quorum) form hencefoorthe.... 
The Lawmakers during the reign of King Henry VII must have 
felt the chances of honest proceeding in the justice courts 
would be improved if at least one justice was of the quorum. 
The parliamentary device of requiring more than one justice 
to be present for the legal transaction of business, was 
not called the "quorum"— there was no name for this rule.
The quorum then, simply referred to that certain number 
of justices of the peace, of eminent learning, or ability, 
whose presence in addition to the other justices, was
12Lambard, loc. cit.
•^james Murry (ed.), A New English Dictionary on 
Historical Principles, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Vol. VIII).
^Ibid.
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necessary to constitute a bench. The Justices were appointed
by _a special commission of the king under the great seal,
the form of which was settled by all of the Judges in 1590.
This appoints them all,
...Jointly and severally,to keep the peace, and any 
two or more of them to inquire of and determine 
felonies and other misdemeanors: in which number
some particular Justices, or one of them are 
directed to be always included, and no business to be 
done without their presence.15
The actual working is recorded in the Eirenarcha by
Lambard, and is as follows: "quorum aliquem vestrum,
A.B.C.D. etc. unum esse volumus," (of whom we will that
A.B.C.D. etc. be one).l6 word"quorum" is derived
from the Latin "who" and means "of whom". Formerly it
was sometimes stated as "corum"; in each instance the
word is the plural genitive of "who".
The order requiring more than one Justice be present
for the legal transaction of business and thus requiring
one to be of the quorum, became neglected as in time all
Justices became of the quorum. ^  In 1753 the custom of
advancing all Justices to the quorum became codified into
law by George II.
...be it enacted by the King's most excellent
l^Blackstone, loc. cit. 
■^Lambard, loc. cit. 
17Blackstone, loc. cit.
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Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the 
lords spiritual and temporal and commons in the 
present parliament assembled, and by authority 
of the same, That...no act, order, adjudication, 
warrent, indenture of apprenticeship, or hereafter 
to be made, done or executed, but two or more 
justices of the peace, which doth not express 
that one or more of the justices is or are of the 
Quorum, shall be impeached, let aside or vacated, 
for that defect only, any law, statute or usage 
to the contrary not-withstanding.lti
Since more than one justice was necessary for the proper
transaction of business, and that, all justices be of the
quorum, these two requirements became synonymous, and
the word "quorum" took on its present day meaning.
The'emergence of the quorum in the House of Commons
as an adopted rule of procedure occurred.on January 5>
1640. ' On that day the House resolved, "that Mr. Speaker
is not to go to his chair till there be at least forty
in the House."19 From that time the rule has been intact
and no attempts have been made to change the quorum concept*
There have, however, been attempts to change the number
required, despite statements to the contrary by many
authors in the field. An attempt was made in the commons
to change the quorum requirement from forty to sixty on
March 18, 1801. The motion failed.^0 In fact in
•^Danby Pickering, Statutes at Large, from the 26-30 
Year of King George II., ( London: Joseph Bentham, 1 7 6 6},
stat. 2b Geo. II C. 27.
19c. H. Parry, The Parliaments and Councils of England, 
(London: John Murray, 1839), P» 3^5.
20i,uther Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of 
Legislative Assemblies^ (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1866), p. 95.
3^
reference to the number necessary to constitute a quorum 
in both the commons and lords, there has been a diversity 
of statements among well-informed writers. Cushing lists 
the discrepancies in his book on legislative procedure*
Judge Story, (Com. on Const.II. 295) says that 
the number of forty-five constitutes a quorum to do 
;i business in the house of commons. And he adds, in a 
. note, 'I have not been able to find, in any books 
within my reach, whether any particular quorum is 
required in the house of lords.'
Chancellor Kent, (Com. I, 235* note b,) says* 
'In the English house of commons, forty members 
used to form a quorum for business, but in 1 8 3 3 » 
the requisite number was reduced to twenty.*
The authors of a French work— Confection of 
'des Lois. (1839)* P» 1-639— having spoken of forty 
members as a quorum of the house of commons, adds, 
in a note, that the number is now fixed at twenty.
The notion, that the quorum of the commons 
;had been reduced from forty to twenty, arose from 
the fact, that in the years 1833 and 18 3 -̂, the house 
met for the transaction of private business at 
three o'clock, and at five, proceeded to the 
public business as before; the quorum for the two 
hours devoted to private business was fixed at 
twenty members; leaving the quorum for the general 
business of the house at forty, as it had been 
established by usage time out of mind. This ar­
rangement for private business was not renewed after 
183^.21
Why the number forty was adopted has given rise to 
speculation by some authors. Laundy states, "It has been 
suggested! that this number was chosen because it coincided 
with the number of counties into which England was divided
21Ibid
at that t i m e . "22 Townsend goes farther when he quotes the 
same reason as that given by Laundy from Dwarris on the 
Statutes but then adds, "The number was most probably chosen 
by accident, as the fitting medium between rigour and 
laxity, Just sufficient to insure a fair hearing, without 
taxing too severely the attention of honourable members."23 
"The origin of the number three as a quorum of the House of 
Lords, " states Cushing, "undoubtedly arose from a principle 
of the Roman Law, that three persons suffice to make a college 
collegium, equivalent to our word corporation, in most of
its legal features."2 -̂
Before the quorum was adopted as a constant rule of
procedure in the parliament, there was an occasion when
the house dismissed for what ostensibly was a quorum
failure. The date was April 20, 1607, thirty-three years
before the formal adoption of the quorum, that, "no Bill
was read this day, and the house arose at ten o'clock,
'being not above threescore.' It seems that sixty was
25not then a sufficient number.
22philip Laundy, The office of Speaker. (London: 
Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & Co., 19bK) 9 P« 206.
23w. C. Towsend, History of the House of Commons 
from 1688 to 1 8 3 2, (London: 1843, Vol. II), p. 3^5.
214- Cushing, loc. cit.
25j0hn Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the 
House of Commons with Observations,(2nd ed.'I London:
H. Hughs, 1784, Vol. II), p. 127. •
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To this day the exact reasoning and oral discussion—  
if any* that occurred in respect to quorum rule of 1640, 
are not known. The general motivation of the house on 
that day, however, has given rise to different interpre­
tations. Josef Redlich, maintains the motive was "the 
desire of the Puritan majority to protect themselves 
against surprise vote during the hours of slack attendance 
in the early part of the setting."2^ Towsend, in his 
Memoirs of the House of Commons, states that the 
quorum rule was, "certainly intended to prevent questions 
being carried by surprise and in a thin h o u s e . " 2 7  Hatsell 
maintains the same reasoning and further states, "that it 
is essential to the fairness of proceeding."2^
Indeed, 1640 was a tumultuous year in England. Not 
only was there strife between the commons and the throne 
on political grounds, there also existed.strife in the 
area of theology. This religious strife was hot restricted 
to the heirarchy of government; the nation as a whole 
had been divided for years over religious differences.
The opposing forces of Catholic tradition and Puritan 
earnestness were contending within the area of Church
Josef Redlich, The Procedure of the House of 
Commons. (London: Archibald Constable Co., I 90B,Vol.II), p. 75*
27Townsend, loc. cit.
^Hatsell. op. cit.. p. 124.
life; within the area of political life the two opposing 
forces of absolutism and desire for popular government, 
were struggling.^ The king represented the established 
church of England, and absolutism, the parliament was 
strongly Puritan and represented the desired popular 
government. As intense as the religious problem was in 
the land, there is little reason to suggest that within 
the House of Commons there were religious factions 
quarrfeling. It seems all effort was directed toward the 
throne. So strong was this feeling of hostility of the 
Puritan parliament toward the king and established church, 
the house between December 18, and December 24, 1640, 
accused Laud, "Archbishop of Canterbury, of High Treason." 
In addition to Laud, ten of the most prominent bishops 
and judges were accused of crimes ranging,^ from treason of 
idolatry and superstltJohQ^? Such action left no doubt
as to the feeling of the commons toward the church and 
king. It should be pointed out that not all the members 
of the commons agreed to the hostility as‘some remained 
firm in their support of the kings
When the dominant party in the commons deter­
mined to destroy Episcopacy, Falkland and Seldon
29h .D. Traill and J.S, Mann (ed.), Social England 
(New Yorks G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1909* Vol IV, Section I.), 
P. 57.
30parry> p-p. cit.. p. 345.
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stood aside from Hampden and Pym. Hyde, to whom 
the Church appeared as a safeguard of order and 
decent devotion, and Falkland, whose foresight 
showed him that the Church, not Puritanism, was 
the defender of intellectual liberty, drew sword 
for 'Church and king.'"3i
Actually, the hostility of Charles I toward the 
parliament was a strong force in drawing the commons 
together in a tight unified group. Considering there 
were 504 members of commons, the"Angelican Reaction" of 
Falkland and Seldon was very limited.
The assertion made by the previously mentioned 
authors concerning a surprise vote in the early days of the 
Long Parliament, seems doubtful. This period in the house 
was marked by extremely strong Puritan strength and the 
possibility of any minority— if there really was a 
significant one at this time— to attain a surprise vote, 
seems remote.
A far more reasonable explanation and one that seems 
a natural out-growth of previous developments, is 
that the house was in need of a device to encourage 
attendance and aid in maintaining order. It was November 3* 
1640 when the Long Parliament convened. With the exception 
of the brief Short Parliament there had been no meeting of
parliament since l629o The new parliament was anxious- to
3^Traill and Mann, op. cit., p. 50.
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Q2declare and discuss the misrule-" of-the king and get . 
about its business. However, soon after the Long 
Parliament settled to work the old problem of gathering and 
holding a house began to plague the organization. As far 
back as December 18, 1621 when "Mr. Secretary moveth, that 
at a certain hour we proceed to business, whether the house 
be full or not,"33 the ability of gathering and holding 
a house had been a problem. This problem had not been 
restricted to the commons; on July 8, 1625 the new monarch, 
Charles I noticed, "the thinness of the House of Lords andi
signifies his pleasure that those present shall not depart."3^ 
In the. commons on July 1 1, 1625 it was ordered, "...the censure 
of the house shall pass upon all such as be absent."35 By 
June 2, 1628, the problem of gathering and holding a house 
was severe enough for the commons to order that:
The House be called, and no excuses made till ■ 
the House is fully called, and then to be heard.
The forfeitures to be disposed as the House shall 
think fit; and if any failing, and his. excuse not 
allowed, a Serjeant-at-Arms to be sent for him to 
come to the House to answer: and after the House 05
called over, the defaulters to be presently called.
-^Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts l603-l660,
(London: Oxford University Press, I9 5 2), p. 9 7 .
33parry, op. cit., p. 2 9 1.
3^Ibid., p. 3 0 2.
35ibid.
36Ibid., p. 3 1 1.
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Even this measure seemed unable to force an adequate 
attendance, thus only three days later the commons ordered:
Whoever is absent without leave on call of the 
House, shall pay L 10, at least. Upon question, 
all such members as, by information to the House, 
without a call, shall appear to absent the service 
of the House, by going out of town, shall incur thelike p e n a l t y . 37
The parliament of 1629 was the last parliament called 
by the king until 1640 when the Short Parliament met for 
a period of about one month. The parliament of 1629 was 
dissolved March 10, yet as late as January 30, "it is 
ordered, in the Commons, that no man go out of the House 
during the sitting of the grand Committee, without licence, 
upon censure, "38 and on February 11, less than two weeks 
later, "ordered in the Commons, every member to attend, 
and none to go out of town."39 a few days later the 
parliament was dismissed and did not meet again until 1640. 
The procedural problem attendent with gathering and holding 
the house was. left unsolved, as no device had been put into 
effect to eliminate it.
During the Short Parliament the topic was not considered 
but only three days after the opening;; of the Long Parlia­
ment on November 5> 1640, the house became involved in a
” 37Ibid.
' 38rbid., p. 3 2 8.
39ibid,t p. 3 3 0 .
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lengthy debate and an order was made, "that the door 
be shut and none suffered to go out, (a very rare practice)."4® 
Still no relief was gained by the working members to hold 
a house, so bn December 4, 1640, it was ordered, "That 
whoever does not take his place, or moves out of it to the 
disturbance of the house, shall pay 12d, to be divided between 
the Serjeant and the poor."41 At last, what appears as 
a final stroke to keep a minimal, acceptable house, it was 
ordered on January 5> 1640, "that Mr. Speaker is not to go 
to his chair, till there be at least forty members in the 
House."42
There can be no doubt that basic parliamentary procedure
was being evolved during this period and the order of
January 5* 1&40 came as a natural out-growth of the previous
efforts of the house to keep its members— or some set number
of them in attendance. The rule was ordered during the
tenure of Speaker Lenthall who introduced various rules for
the preservation of order without which, "many a sitting
of the Long Parliament whould have collapsed in chaos and 
»43uproar. J Lenthall's reaction to the erratic attendance
4oIbid., p. 341.
4lIbid«, p. 344.
4 2Ibid., p. 345.
4 3Laundy, loc. cit.
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habits of the parliament, was such that two months after 
the parliament had been in session— about the time of the 
quoruih resolution— he found reason to complain of, "the conduct 
of' members so unworthy to sit in parliament that could rim 
forth for their dinners, or to the playhouses and bowling 
alleys, leaving business of great weight."^ Townsend, 
in addition to this, remarks about a "thin house" stating 
further that quorum rule was a safeguard "required to correct 
the general laxity of discipline and attendance whi’oh suc­
ceeded the Restoration."24'-* It is interesting to note that 
the majority in the most numerous house during the reign 
of Charles I consisted Of two only, 176 to 17̂ -. Even this 
full house of 350 left still a third wanting.^
With the few exceptions noted earlier the house of 
January 16^0 was not factionallzed, at least during the 
early months of that year; thus, the quorum order of that 
day was probably geared to force attendance. The majority 
was essentially undivided and the threat of a surprise 
vote at that time seems doubtful. It may well have been 
the case that some members saw eliminated in this motion 
the ability of any extremely smaill house to carry a
w iMa.
^Townsend, loc. cit.
LlA . .Townsend, op. cit.. p. 366
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surprise vote but if such sentiment existed there is little 
reason to believe that it was discussed. It is quite possible, 
however,' that many of the members of the house might have 
considered the order of January 5, 1640 as a method of 
protecting majorities and minorities.
Quorum Usage in the American Colonies: The utilization of
the quorum in the proceedings of the first colonies was or­
dered by the government of England before that government 
imposed such a regulation upon itself. There are many reasons 
that can be conjectured as to why this procedural device was 
used— or imposed— on the colonies. Perhaps the most reason­
able is simply that the colonies were no more than branch 
offices of a trading company far removed from the eye of the 
main office in London; as such, the company a's well as the 
throne and commons, desired influence by any means possible, 
including dictating the form of internal proceedings their 
councils were to use. A device'such as a quorum could be 
indispensable in stemming the power of any one man or group.
For instance, the charter of the Massachusetts Bay of 
1629, states,
...and that the said Governor, Deputie Governor, and 
assistants of the saide Company, for the tyme being, 
shall or maie once every Month, or oftener at their 
Pleasures, Assemble and Houlde and keepe a Courte or 
Assemblie of themselves, for the better ordering and 
directing of their Affaires, and that any seaven or 
more persons of the assistants, together with the
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Governor, or Deputie Governor soe assembled, shalbe 
saide, taken, held and reputed to be, and shalbe a 
full and sufficient Courte or Assemblie of the said 
Company, for the handling ordering, and despatching 
of all such Buysiness and Occurrents as shall from 
tyme to tyme happen.4 '
The charter continued, calling for "greater and general
Courts" scheduled through the year, and specified that,
...The Governor or Deputie Governor and six of the 
Assistants and Freeman of the saide Company as shalbe 
present, or the greater nomber of them so assembled, 
whereof the Governor or Deputie Governor and six of the 
Assistants of the least to be seaven, shall have full 
powe^gand authoritie to choose, nominate, and appointe, 
etc.
In the commission of Sir Ednumd Andros appointing him 
"Captain General and Governor in Chief in and over all 
that part of pur territory and dominion of New England in 
America,"^ a charter, signed by James II, makes specific 
reference to the quorum. The power given Andros was restrict­
ed for the most part to the "advise and consent of our
said Council...any five whereof we do hereby appoint to be a 
50Quorum." Just why the quorum number was changed from 
seven to five for the Colonial Council, raises questions 
that require too much speculation to.be considered here.
hr?'U. S., Congress, House, American Charters Constitutions 
and Organic Laws, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1906, House Doc.5190 
Vol. 37 P. 1^53.
^8Ibid.
49ibid.
5°lbid., p. 1 9 6 3.
45
It should be noted, however, that the charter of 1629 had
been cancelled by a judgment of the high court of Chancery
of England, June of 168̂ 1-. The Andros commission was a charter
specifying the nature of power and government in the colonies
during the interim years until 1691 when the government was
reorganized under the charter of that year. The charter
specified that the "Governour of our Province..assemble and
call together the Councillors or Assistants..Seaven of them at
the least shall and may from time to time hold and keep a
Council for the ordering and directing the Affaires of our
said P r o v i n c e . T h i s  particular quorum requirement was
one quarter of the total body since the charter calls for
a total of "eight and Twenty Assistants or Councillors."
This particular group became the upper body of the government
and as a result of a statute of October 1 6 9 2, which formed
a branch with a quorum requirement that stated, "Forty
/
representatives at any time so assemblied shall be accounted
ia number sufficient to constitute a House,...and do any 
business proper to be done in that h o u s e . I t  can be 
assumed that the number was selected to conform to the 
requirement of 1640 in the English House of Commons. The 
Massachussetts Constitution of 1780* written after the. 
revolution, calls for "not less than sixty members of the
^ibid., p, 1878.
52Luce, op. cit., p. 24.
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house of representatives shall constitute a quorum for 
doing business," and, "Not less than sixteen members of the 
senate shall constitute a quorum for doing b u s i n e s s . "53
On the other hand the charter of Maryland in 1632 which- 
was granted to Lord Baltimore, contained no quorum regulation. 
The charter remained in force until the revolution of 1776 
when a new constitution of that year stated, "that not less 
than a majority of Delegates...constitute a H o u s e . "54 The 
constitution of 1867 reaffirms the majority as a quorum.
In the Province of New Hampshire the royal commission 
simply stated that, in order to make laws, statutes and 
ordinances, "the consent of the governor and the major part 
of both houses was necessary."55 Precisely what constituted 
a quorum was apparently never mentioned as indicated by an 
entry!made in the Provincial Papers in July 1 6 9 6, when 
it was asked "whether three of the assembly was a. house 
and could adjourn and whether it was legal," to which the 
house replied that, "there was no prefixed number appointed 
and that it was legal."5^ No mention of a quorum was made 
until 1745 when from that time on the number was regularly
•^House Document, on. cit.. p. 1 8 9 8.
5^lbid.. p. 1 6 9 2.
55william H. Pry, New Hampshire as a Royal Province3 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), p.. 146.
56lbid.
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specified in the rules adopted by every succeeding assembly 
at its first assembly. Still the number fluctuated in 
relationship to the growth of the number of representatives. 
Thus, in 1745, when the house consisted of twenty members, 
the speaker and at least eleven members had to be present 
before business could be transacted. In 17^2, when there 
were thirty-one present, it was voted that the speaker 
and fifteen members should constitute a quorum. In 1771, 
when the house consisted of thirty-four members, the quorum 
consisted of the speaker and sixteen members, while in 1 7 7 5, 
it was still further increased, embracing the speaker and
eighteen members.57
Rhode Island, settled in 16 3 6, by Roger Williams, 
received its first charter from the king in 1 6 4 3 .  The charter 
does not discuss any quorum requirement: however conflict
over the matter must have occurred because in 1672 the rep­
resentatives damanded a degree of autonomy given the English 
House of Commons. A resulting reform bill included that,
In all weighty matters, wherein the King's honor is 
most Jeoparded...the Assembly shall be the major part 
of the Deputies belonging to the whole collony, as there 
must be.the major part of the Assistants (by the charter). 
Butt otherwise, such said act (if made without-the 
greater part of the Deputies present) such said act 
shall be voyd and of none e f f e c t . 5 o
57ibid.
58;Luce, op. cit., p. 2 5.
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There was,however, a quorum requirement in the lesser
town government of Providence, Rhode Island, as early as
October 2, l655» as Indicated by an excerpt of the town record,
First all actionab [sic] Cases shall be tried by 
6 ‘Towriesman as'in ye Nature of a Jury; Yet with ye 
libertie of not being Put on Swearing, and these 6 ,
men to be Princed downe by ye Towne quarterly, and 
warned 3 days before the Court by ye Seargeant to be 
ready at ye day and hower appointed Vender ye Penaltie 
of 3 for ye Neglect.
The idea of a majority constituting a quorum in Rhode 
Island has remained constant and is specifically stated as 
a requirement in the constitution of 1842.
The Carolinas are good examples of where the crown’s 
officials attempted to maintain control of the colonies by 
refusing them the power to regulate their own rules and 
procedure. Under proprietary regulations the quorum was 
held at one third, significantly higher than forty 
required in the house of commons. In South Carolina in
tI?l6 , ,a statute set the quorum at sixteen, slightly more
1 ithan half of the total membership of thirty-one. In 1719»
the number of representatives was raised to thirty-six
& 0and the quorum to nineteen. When the house grew to 
forty-eight, nineteen was nearly forty percent of the
59The Early records of the Town of Providence. (Provid­
ence i Snow Farnham Printers) Vol. II, p. 8 5 .
6®Jaok P. Greene, The Quest for Power.(Williamsburg, 
Virginia* University of North Carolina Press, 1963)p* 217.
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house, which caused occasional complaints:
Governor James Glen wrote in 1748 that the size of 
the quorum often created 'many obstructions and delays.
A Party of pleasure made by a few of the Members,' he 
lamented, 'renders it often impossible for the rest 
to enter upon Business, and sometimes I have seen a 
Party made to go out of Town purposely to break the 
House as they call it (well knowing that nothing could 
be transacted in their Absence) and in this manner to 
prevent the Success of what they could not otherwise 
oppose.' In 1756 the Board of Trade also contended 
that the size of the established quorum,'put it into 
the power of any one or two factious Member(s) who 
have an Influence in His Majesty's service and the 
Publeck good of the Province by prevailing upon others 
to absent themselves.’ The Board suggested that 
Governor Lyttilton alter.the situation, but neither 
he nor his successors made any effort to do so.
In North Carolina, the Fundamental Constitution of 1669 
provided that a quorum should consist of not less than half 
of the total members.62 The royal governor complained that 
a majority was too high for a quorum as it was much more diff­
icult for the governor to control from twenty-five to thirty- 
five members than fifteen.^ Attempts were made by a succession 
of governors starting with Johnston in 1746 when he attempted
to reduce the number to f i f t e e n . 64 The issue was not*
resolved and in November 17 6 0, the house adopted a resolution
6 lIbid.
^^House Document, op. cit., p. 2 7 8 2.
63c. E. Raper, North Carolina. (New York: MacMillan Co.,
1904), p. 2 1 8 .
Greene, op. cit.. p. 218.
• ■ : i;
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reaffirming the majority rule. Governor Dobbs was power­
less to enforce his quorum requirement of fifteen members
because the lower house simply declined to act unless a
65maj'ority were present. The house used the quorum issue
to exert its independency and seldom allowed the number as
66designated by the crown to be the actual one. Thus in
effect, the house denied the royal authority power to regulate
its internal proceedings in regard to a quorum and succeeded
in enforcing a provision of their own.
In the original charter for the Province of Pennsylvania,
in l68'l, given to William Penn, no mention of a quorum is
made, However, one year later in Penn's Charter of Liberties
granted by the king, a provincial council of 72 persons was
to meet yearly. The council composed of persons "moste noted
for their Wisdom, Virtue and Ability"— was subject to the
following: "not lesse than Two Thirds of the whole Provincial
Council shall make a Quorum and that the Consent and appro*
bation of Two Thirds of said Quorum shall be had in all*
such Cases or matters of Moment." However for routine 
business it was ordered that, "...in all cases and matters 
of lesser mement Twenty-four members of the said Provincial 
Council shall make a quorum, The Majority of which four
65Ibid.
66Raper,' op. cit., p. 222.
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and Twenty shall and may always determine on such Cases, 
and Causes of Lesser M o m e n t . T h e  clause for minor 
business was excluded in the Charter of Privileges of 1701 
and replaced by a requirement of “Two Thirds of the Whole 
Number that ought to meet.'’̂ 8 As the colonial charter 
gave way to a constitution in 177&, the unique requirement 
of two-thirds was continued— but unlike the charter of 
1 7 0 1, the constitution neglects to define which two-thirds: 
of those present or of the total enrollment of the body.
The omission, as well as the large number, must have caused 
concern for all subsequent constitutions (of which there 
were three) require a reduced quorum of a majority with 
a provision for a non-quorum to adjourn to locate absent 
members
The lands of present day New York, previous to 1777* 
were in charters of other colonies, including Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania and grants to the Duke of York. New York,';/ 
until 1 7 7 1, appears to have been exempt from quorum difficulties. 
.However, in that year the crown’s Instructions to Governor 
William Tryon stated:
^House Document, op. cit., p. 30^8 . 
6 8Ibld.. p. 3078.
6 9Ibld.. p. 309^.
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And although by our commission aforesaid* we have 
thought fit to direct that any three of the members of 
our said council make a quorum* it is nevertheless our 
will and pleasure that you do not act with a quorum 
of less than five members* unless upon extraordinary 
emergencies when a great number cannot conveniently be had.70
The council had eleven members; after the revolution erupted*
New York framed a constitution calling for a majority quorum;
this same requirement remained in all subsequent constitutions.71 '
One of the earliest charters was that which established
the colony of Virginia. The early charters were quite
specific on the quorum matter. For instance the charter of
16 1I-I2 stated:
The’Treasurer* Company of Adventureres and Planters...
Keep a court and Assembly...the Treasurer or his Deputy* 
to be always one* and the Number.of fifteen others... 
shall be sufficient Court...for dispatching casual and 
particular Occurrences* and accidental Matters of less 
Consequence...72
The above provision is for the handling and ordering of
matters of less consequence; however* the subsequent paragraph
of the charter sets up a more formidable quorum requirement
for "affairs of greater Weight and Importance...the said
Treasurer and Company or the greater Number of them* so
assembled* shall and may have full Power and Authority..."73
70jQU C e ^ op. cit., p. 2 7 .
^House Document* op. cit.* p. 2 6 2 3. 
72Il3id<> V. lls p# 3 8 0 5.
73jbid.
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This charter was issued to the colony of Virginia thirty
years before the English House requirement of 1640. The
latter requirement can only be termed a majority requirement
which was repeated in future houses. The Virginia Constitution
of 1776 creates a two house legislature with a majority of
the twenty-four members of the senate a quorum but the
74document fails to provide a quorum for the house. This 
apparent oversight was remedied in the constitution of 1830 
and the quorum has remained a majority for both houses since.
In addition to the colonies mentioned, there is little 
that differs in the early charters and constitutions of the 
few remaining colonies in respect to the quorum. There is 
a very definite limit to the extent to which the procedure 
of one body can serve as a model for another. Yet by the 
close of the colonial years of American history, all of the 
colonies had some form of quorum requirement. Not all the 
legislatures had adopted the rule of a majority quorum but 
it was adopted by most of them. Pennsylvania and Vermont 
both reduced their quorum requirements from two-thirds to a 
simple majority by 1790* South Carolina, Georgia and
i
Massachusetts were the only States permitting less than a 
majority to do business and all three have abandoned the
7 cpractice. It should be noted that the House of Commons
f ^ I b i d . ,  p. 3 8 1 6.
75Luce, op. cit., p. 28.
54
and the Crown, as the creating bodies for colonial charters, 
one time only, imposed the same quorum requirement on a
i ' tl <
colony as the one imposed on themselves; further, the quorum 
impositions were, for the most part, imposed on the colonies 
before the English house adopted its own.
The Quorum Rule and the Federal Constitution: By the latter 
half of the 18th Century, the quorum had permeated the coun­
cils and legislatures of America as an established function 
of procedure. As such, it is not surprising that it became 
an item of concern in the drafting of a Federdl Constitution.
It was into August of 1?8? before the delegates to the 
Federal Constitutional Convention came to the problem of the 
quorum. It was handled with dispatch and the deliberations 
lasted but a short time. Article VI, Section 3» of the pro­
posed constitution stated, "In each House a majority of the 
members shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smal- 
ler number may adjourn from day to day."' The following 
acoount of the deliberations, taken wholly from James Madison’s 
notes (the only authoritative, extant source), recounts 
Nathaniel Ghorum, delegate from Massachusetts, opposing the 
motion because, "less than a Majority in each House should 
be a Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in busi­
ness and great inconveniences from the future increase
^James Madison, Debates In the Federal Convention of 
1787. (ed.) Hunt & Scott, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1920), p. 339.
77of members. Mercer of Maryland concurred, and added that 
"so great a number will put in the power of a few by seceding 
at a critical moment to introduce convulsions, and endanger 
the government.7® Mercer favored leaving it to the legislature 
to fix their own :quorum the same as in the English house 
and thus keep it at a small number. Mason from Virginia 
countered with the argument that less than a majority quorum 
would be, "dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small 
number of members of the two Houses to make laws," and 
that the "Central States could always take care to be on the 
Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or wearing 
their patience, and outstaying them could carry such measures 
as they pleased." King from Massachusetts retorted that 
such might be the case but he was of the opinion, "that 
public inconvenience..was more to be dreaded.", Governor 
Morris from Pennsylvania moved to fix the quorum at thirty- 
three members in the House and fourteen in the Senate which 
was a majority of the time. King amended this to have 
fourteen and thirty-three the lowest numbers but, "leaving 
the Legislatures at liberty to increase them or not."
Elseworth of Connecticut, Wilson of Pennsylvania and Gerry 
of Massachusetts, noted that seventeen would be a majority 
out of a quorum of thirty-three and eight of fourteen, hence
7 7Ibid., p. 3 7 6 . 
7 8Ibid.
I
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questions might possibly be carried by as few as two large 
states and in the senate with the aid of two small states.79
The motion as amended was defeated nine to two and the 
original carried with the additional wording, requested by 
Randolph and Madison, of, "and may be authorized to compel 
attendance of absent members in such manner and under such 
penalties as each house may provide."®0 One further amend­
ment was made to the quorum. It was moved by Madison that 
the right of expulsion was too important to be excercised 
by a, "bare majority" and that two-thirds should be required. 
The motion passed but not without opposition from Governor 
Morris who felt that the power could safely be trusted to 
a majority and that to require more would invite abuses 
from the minority. Despite Morris's objection the motion 
carried.®1
The nature of the debate over the quorum reflected the 
attitudes, fears and interests of the period as much as a
concern for proper procedure. From the debate it appears
%
the compelling reason why a smaller number than a majority 
of the members of each house should not be permitted to 
make laws, was to be found in the extent of the country and
79ibid., p. 3 7 7. 
®°Ibid., p. 378. 
8lIbid.
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the diversity of its interests. Thus the concern was the 
possibility of the central states being "on the spot" and 
the distant states precluded from legislative deliberations.
A further consideration is that sectional cleavages, were 
not manifest in the quorum as much as the fear of the small 
states being domineered by the large ones— thus, the rejection 
of Morris's motion.
Unfortunatly and despite good intentions, the quorum 
provision that was placed in the constitution had several 
built-in problems that were to plague the Senate and House 
of Representatives off and on for the next one hundred 
years. The actual concept of a required number present for 
the legal transaction of business was well permeated into 
American procedural practice by the termination of the 
revolutionary period. It is not surprising then, that the 
states would, with slight exception include a quorum 
requirement in their own constitutions. Thomas Jefferson 
in his manual of procedure which he designed^for the new 
states of America, advocated a quorum and referred to 
Hatsell for his precedent.
Indeed then, the quorum by the eighteenth century was 
a fundamental aspect of parliamentary procedure, well 
imbedded in the state constitutions. The potential problems 
inherent in a simple majority quorum were not to errupt to 
any great extent until the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. This is not to say however, that some forms of
t
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quorum obstruction had not already taken place. Since dach 
house of the American Congress defines its own set of 
procedures, and each is accorded high respect by the citizens 
of America, it was perhaps a degree of good fortune that the 
major problems concerning the quorum were resolved for the 
American people in such august bodies. Further definitions 
of the quorum were made by the courts of this country with 
strong ramifications for private organizational procedure.
The new modifications that were necessary in utilization 
of the quorum were for the most part brought about by the 
need to .eliminate obstructionism that had slowly been 
developing in this country.
Obstructionism and the Quorumt Obstructionism in parliamentary 
procedure is a relatively modern problem. Hundreds of years 
passed during the evolutionary period of parliament and 
procedural growth without any concerted attempts to completely 
nullify the efforts of parliamentary bodies for the desired 
ends of a minority. Modern parliamentary obstructionism is 
usually credited to Parnell and the Irish delegation in the 
commons. The type practiced by Parnell in the name of Irish 
nationalism was a menace to the principle of majority 
government. During the formative years of the House of 
Commons;*. certain incidents occurred that could be calledi
obstructionism, although the form was mild in most instances. 
The quorum in the House of Commons as a device of obstruct­
59
ionism has never been great enough to endanger the system 
as was the case during Parnell's reign. Conversely, in the 
United States House of Representatives, the quorum became 
a severe enough problem to threaten the very foundations 
of the house.
Long before the first instances of deliberate, quorum
obstructionism occurred in the commons, a very prophetic
clerk saw a potential evil in its use. John Hatsell was the
clerk and as such compiled one of the first complete sets
of precedents of the House of Commons. During Hatsell's
time a great deal of business was conducted by the House of
Lords— which is no longer the case since much of their
former power has passed on to the House of Commons. In any
event, Hatsell was concerned with the Speaker who returned
from the Lords to inform the commons of their activities and
not finding a quorum. Hatsell concluded,
I should think he ought, at least, to report what has 
passed in the House of Lords; for it might otherwise 
happen that, for want of forty Members, the Speaker 
might be prevented from taking the Chair that day, 
and from communicating to the House a speech or message 
from the King, of which, 'as a message to adjourn,
and several other matters,1 they ought to be immediately
informed; especially as it is always in the power of 
any Member to prevent the proceeding in any other 
business than the report of the message, by calling 
upon the Speaker to count the House.
If such an occurrence took place, Hatsell fails to state,
ftP rJohn Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of 
Commons with Observations, (2nd ed.; London: H. Hughs., 17^/
Vol. II), p. 75.
i- • , j | . •* <
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but there can be no doubt that his mind perceived the 
potential for obstructionism of sorts.
It wasn't until 1729, eighty-nine years after the 
establishing of the original quorum rule that a speaker 
announced the house was adjourned for want of forty members. 
After the initial eighty-nine years had passed, failures of 
the house to make were not so far apart, happening almost 
yearly through the 18th century. In the house, the actual 
method of counting is as follows. After the House has been 
made, if notice be taken that forty members are not present, 
the Speaker directs strangers to withdraw; and members are 
summoned. After the expiration of two minutes, the Speaker 
proceeds to count the house, the outer door being kept open 
during the proceeding to enable members approaching from 
the lobby to be included in the count. If it,be after 
four o'clock (on Friday, one o'clock) that the absence of 
a quorum is proved, the Speaker at once adjourns the house 
until the next setting day.®3 There are further rules that 
have been developed in regards to the quorum but in essence 
the above is the general procedure.
The Speaker does not count the house but rather assumes 
a quorum to be present unless his attention is drawn to the
®^sir Thomas Erskine May, Treatise on the Law, Privileges, 
Proceedings, and Usages of Parliament, (16th ed.; London: 
Butterworth & Co., 1957), p. 331«
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absence of a quorum. Any member is entitled to draw attention
to the absence of a quorum at any time during a sitting simply
by so directing the Speaker to count. Failure to make a
quorum is termed in the English Commons as "count out."
Franqueville, A French critic of the British House
states, "some members sometimes take malicious pleasure in
demanding a count out in order to end discussion which
embarrasses them or to delay the vote on a measure they
oppose Franquerville, noted the lighter and sometimes
petulant side of the house when he reports,
They have lots of fun sometimes, particularly at the 
dinner hour when the benches are empty and the orators 
speak in a. desert or rather for the journalists and the 
voters. Sometimes they ask for several successive 
counts and succeed in obtaining the desired result 
to the great discontent of some deputies. When this 
occurs the whips are blamed, one of whose principle „ 
functions consists in making and maintaining a c h a m b e r .
On June 8, l871> Sir John Packington was the victim of a
count out. He complained that at the moment he was about to
take the floor a member asked for the count out and caused
the end of the session. He saw one of the ministers pass
to one: of his colleagues a note on which was written, "We
Q/T: have come to count Packing on out; he is the first to speak."00 
So entirely does the Speaker depend upon the house for
power to exercise his authority, that even if the number of
\
^Franqueville, Gouvernment et Le Parlement Britanniques, 
Ed., Ji Rothschild, (Paris:.. 1887)7 Vol. Ill, p. 6 7 .
85Ibld.
86Ibld.
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members present drops below the required quorum, he cannot 
take notice of the facts. However, if only two members were 
before the Speaker he could not take notice of the fact, nor 
could he stop the business of the house. Thus, if one member 
proposed a resolution and another seconded it,- the Speaker 
would have to put the question to a house composed of those 
two members. Further, such an action would appear in the 
House Journal as if it had been agreed to by the whole body 
of almost 7001
Since the speaker has no power to notice that the 
number in the house has fallen below the quorum, it must 
be brought to his attention by a member. Once some mention 
has been made then all business stops at the Speaker’s cry 
of "Order, Order," and two minutes are sallowed for the 
formation of the quorum and if not made debate stops and
0(7
the house is closed for the evening. ' It takes only the
slightest hint of no quorum to set the speaker in motion
as indicated by the following example:
■About a score of our representatives were giving 
serious attention to a very serious address, on a 1 
very important subject, by a very serious brother 
member...Vexed by the scanty attendance that 
listened to his all-important subject, he joked about 
the crowded benches, the packed House, that he pretended 
to see around. The jest was fatal; he had referred 
to the number present; this done, the Speaker must 
determine what that number is. Order1 Orderi" from 
the chair, silenced the debater.. Amazed he sat.down,
^Reginald Palgrave, The House of Commons, (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1 8 6 9), p. 7b.
63
quite ignorant of the effect of his wit,— then the 
Speaker rose in all solemnity;'in due custom he began 
the regular "one, two, three, as his extended arm 
pointed in stately circuit to each member. Soon all 
was over; the two minutes elapsed; but twenty heads 
were counted, and the House broke up, much in laughter 
at the luckless orator, who had counted himself out.88
Another unusual quorum incident that could be considered
obstructionism occurred at the conclusion of Arthur Onslow’s
career as Speaker of the House; an incident that asserts
the power of procedure over the throne,
It was January 1761, and the King was in the House of 
Lords, waiting to give his assent to the Money Bill.
The King waited and the Lords waited; they could do 
nothing else until the Speaker appeared at the Bar.
And still they waited; and still there was no Speaker. 
There were questions, agitations, whisperings, titters, 
growlings; what had become of old Arthur? But old 
Arthur was behaving, as usual, with exemplary correct­
ness. He could not leave the House of Commons; indeed 
he could not regard the House and the Speaker as being 
officially in existence at all. Fewer than forty 
members were present, and Arthur could not, would not, 
budge until he had the necessary q u o r u m . ?9
In what must have been a crude attempt at obstruction, a
complaint was made on June 10, 187^ that members had been
obstructed on their return to the House during a count.
The speaker said it was the duty of the sergeant to keep
free access to the House, and he believed that duty had been
properly discharged.9°
88Ibld.. p. 79.
89c. E. Vulliamy, The Onslow Family, (London: Chapman 
& Hall, 1953), p. 128.
9°May, op. cit., p. 332.
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Free access to the parliament seems to have been a 
problem in earliest times. Even the Tenendi directs a 
door keeper to be present and make sure "entrance be denied 
to none who ought to be present at the parliament."91 
Even more significant is the rule in the Modus that without 
his commons, the King could do nothing and the Modus directs 
the commons after they are summoned not to come if, "the 
Lord the King does not govern them as he ought."^2 Just 
how, or if the commons ever utilized this quorum rule to 
force action from the king is not known.
Although the number present might fall below the quorum, 
the validity of the votes or resolutions passed before the 
quorum count is demanded, cannot be challenged. Cushing 
reports that it has been said to be the practice, in the 
House of Commons, for the government or administration, to 
take measures to prevent the formation of a house on 
particular occasions, with the purpose in mind of putting 
off or suppressing discussion, which they wish to get rid 
of, without putting it down to a direct vote. The business 
assigned beforehand for the day, on which the sitting is 
thus prevented or terminated, falls to the ground, and must 
be renewed on some other day; since each day is usually 
appropriated in advance, for a considerable period, it is
^^homas D. Hardy (ed.), Modus Tenendi Parliamentum,
(London: Eyre and Spottiswode), P. 24^
92Ibid., p. 42.
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difficult, if not i m p o s s i b l e . 93 Cushing neglects to cite 
specific examples of the above manipulation but such activities 
seem quite probable in a house whose ministers have been known
at times to be less than scrupulous.
In the national government and particularly the United 
States House of Representatives, the full impact of a quorum 
struggle has been realized. As far back in history as 1788, 
the author of the 58th Federalist paper while advocating a 
new Federal structure for the new nation of America, was
1
also quick to note procedural problems that might interfere
in a strong government. It is not known if it was Hamilton
or Madison who warned that, although there are some advantages
to a majority or more than a majority quorum, they are out
weighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In the
author's words,
...it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice 
of secessions; a practice which has shown itself even 
in States where a majority only is required; a prac­
tice subversive of all the principles of order and reg­
ular government; a practice which leads more directly 
to public convulsions and the ruin of popular govern­
ments than.any other which has yet been displayed 
among us.9^
As sincere and ominous as those words are, there have 
been no instances of secessions in the early Congresses of 
the national government— if by secessions it was meant
1
93Luther Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of 
Legislative Assemblies, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
ltio6 ), p. 1 5 1. .. .
^Hamilton, op. cit., p. 301.
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that certain states or delegation to the Congress would
depart the sessions so as to have attendance fall below the'
quorum requirement and thus obstruct business. This is not 
to say however, that the quorum requirement as adopted has 
not been used to stifle, business: it is simply that a
different method of quorum obstructionism was developed, 
a method not foreseen by the framers of the constitution.
The first hint of quorum trouble in the Federal Congress 
> • did not occur until Jackson's administration, when members
of the House seem to have caused a quorum to fail, by de-
dining to v o t e . 95 This event was on May 9, 1834* and
although the record is somewhat vague on the matter, it may
have set the precedent, for on May 30* 1836 the refusal of
Members to vote moved John Bell of Tenessee to say, "the
time might and probably would come, when the order of the
House would be broken up by a factious m i n o r i t y . " - ^  He then
made it clear that he favored prompt punishment of members
who refused to vote.
<v.
Aside from these incidents, nothing occurred to suggest 
a quorum problem in the national government until 1840. In 
that year no less a person than John Quincy Adams stifled 
house business and in so doing set the precedent for a new
S. Congress, House, Roster of Debates, 23rd Cong., 
First Session, 1834-, p. 4023.
9^Ibid., 24th Cong. First Session, 1836, p. 4086-4099*
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form of quorum obstructionism.
The event started out innocuously enough. The state of 
New Jersey had a contested election case and the elected 
members to the house were considered by Adams to be false 
claimants. On March 6 * they were to be sworn in without
, f
waiting for additional evidence that Adams maintained would 
have a bearing on the matter. The following comes from the 
Diary of John Adams and gives an interesting account of the 
matter.
. I had resolved* if thus called* not to answer to my 
name. Many other members had determined to do the 
same3 and if all the minority would do so* the majority 
could not form a quorum of the House* and therefore could 
not perpetrate this outrage upon all justice and all 
law...I resolved* however* at all events to practice 
it myself* and await the consequences.97
Adams found the device to be one that produced results and
although there was "some flinching on the Administration
side*" he continued to use it. On March 2^* Adams recounts,
The count was again taken by tellers* and was 10 ayes*
.85 noes— all the opposition members forebearing to vote* 
and thus leaving the majority without a quorum. The 
committee were thus compelled to rise and report this 
fact to the House; and this first disclosed to both 
parties of the House; the secret of the defensive 
strength of the. minority— a strength the more impreg­
nable as it consists in silence and precludes all 
disorder. The rage of the majority at this discovery 
was unbounded; but it was impotent.^
The opposition attempted to stifle the ability of the
97john Quincy Adams* The Diary of 179^-1845» Allan 
Nevins* ed.* (New York; Longmans* Green & Co.* 1 9 2 8), p. 505*
98Ibid., p. 506
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minority to remain silent and on March 25, it was moved by 
Representative Taylor, "moved that I should be compelled 
to vote. Not in order. Beatty moved a resolution to censure 
upon me for not voting. Not in order. Motions to suspend 
the call, and to adjourn, were multiplied, and failed, e t c . " 99
Adams had struck upon the easiest method of obstruc­
tionism.; the silent— or disappearing— quorum. It was a 
practice by which the minority part could prevent any 
legislation or business they disliked by refusing a quorum.
A quorum was presumed to be present unless questioned, but 
the rules permitted a roll call upon demand of a fifth of 
the membership. Minority members would demand the roll and 
then remain silent when their names were called. Since the 
rules prescribed that a member's presence was established 
only by a viva-voce reply to the roll, and since it required 
a majority of the whole to constitue a quorum, the silent 
filibuster could effectively stop the House from doing 
business. For nonpartisan matters the quorum would reappear,
fl.
only to vanish again as soon as a vote was asked on ahy 
pending bill opposed by the minority. The process could 
be repeated interminably until the majority dropped the 
bin.100
99ibid.
100Barbara Tuchman, "Czar of the House", American Heritage, 
XIV, (December, 1 9 6 2), p..33.
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The device worked well for Adams but perhaps even he 
realized its potential disruption in the house for he 
refrained from further quorum obstruction during his term.
The device lay dormant for several years before it was again 
utilized to any great extent. This may or may not be due 
to a respect of legislative procedure but simply because the 
conditions were not right for its use. Optimum effective­
ness of the silent quorum requires a close division of the 
house. If this is not the case, the majority party can form 
its own group to comply with the quorum requirement and in 
so doing, void the minority obstruction.
Even before Adam’s disruption of the house; there had 
been instances of quorum problems in the state governments.
In their haste to ratify the constitution, the federalists 
in Pennsylvania had called for the question on adoption.
The antifederalist pointed out the motion was out of order
since Congress had not yet sent them the new constitution 
and therefore it had not been given the required three 
readings. The nineteen antifederalists held an indignation 
meeting and decided they would foil the proceedings by 
staying away.
It took 47 to make a quorum, and without these malcontents 
the assembly numbered but 45. When the house was called
to order after dinner, it was found there were but 45
members present. The sergeant-at-arms was sent to 
summon the delinquints, but they defied him, and so it 
became necessary to adjourn till next morning. It was 
now the turn of the Federalists to uncork the vials of 
wrath. The affair was disucssed in the taverns till
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after midnight, the 19 were abused without stint, 
and soon after breakfast, next morning, two of them 
were visited by a crowd of men, who broke into their 
lodgings and dragged them off to the state,house, where 
they were forcibly held down in their seats, growling 
and muttering curses. This made a quorum... a
Many states have had some unique experiences with quorum
obstructionism, but perhaps none have suffered as much as
Tennessee. As late as 1911» thirty-four members of the house,
enough to break a quorum, fled to Alabama, because of contem-
iplated changes in temperance and election laws. Apparently
a fine time was had by all as they ventured on to Georgia.
The minority stayed on, met from day to day and worked out
a compromise suitable to the absentees, who finally returned
102after two months absence.
However, there can be no doubt that so far as volume 
and severity of obstruction, the national House of Represent­
atives was hardest hit, yet most reluctant to correct the 
problem. While the house was suffering from the problem 
of the silent quorum, many state houses had eliminated it.
In fact when Speaker Seed broke the quorum in 1891» he 
utilized the rationale set forth by Lieutenant Governor and 
presiding:: officer David G. Hill of New York, who eliminated 
the silent quorum there. Hill, in 1883, maintained that 
the constitutional provision as to a quorum was entirely
101John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History.
(Boston* Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1888), p. 373*102Luce, op. clt.. p. 35.
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satisfied by the presence of the members, even if they did not
vote,! and accordingly he directed the recording officer of the
senate to put down the names of the members of the senate
who were present and refused to vote.
In his ruling on the matter, Hill stated:
...Today there are present over three-fifths of all 
' the senators elected. They sit in their seats before 
" me. Rule 14 of the senate requires each senator to 
vote when his name is called, but a number— more than 
enought to constitute the requisite three-fifths— refuse 
to vote at all, either for or against the bill, and 
remain silent. It is claimed that, therefore, they 
are to be deemed absent and cannot be counted as 
constituting a quorum. They are not absentees within 
the meaning of the rules, because they are in fact 
present. There can be no 'call of the house' or 
other proceedings instituted to compel their attendance, 
because they are not absent. Their action is in defiance 
of the rules of this body, factious, and revolutionary.
If, because they refuse to respond to their names 
when called, they are thereby to be deemed absent, of 
what use are the rules of this body and the law which 
gives this body authority to send its sergeant-at-arms 
for its absent members and forcibly bring them into 
this chamber, if, when brought in, they can still refuse 
to vote and still be deemed absent? It would show that 
all such provisions in the rules and in the statutes 
were entirely nugatory and of no force or effect. There 
is no principle of parliamentary law which permits a 
senator to be present in his seat and refuse to respond 
to his name, and then be allowed to insist that he is 
not present. If he does not want to be regarded as 
present he must remain away from the chamber. This 
is common sense, and it is not antagonistic to . 
parliamentary law.l°3
A similar decision was made in Tennessee in 1 8 8 5.
In the legislature, the house had ninety-nine members, of which
1
two-thirds was sixty-six. A registration bill was pending
103u. Congress, House, Hinds Precedents, 59th Cong., 
2nd Session., 1906, Vol. 4, p. 6 9 .
72
which was objected to by the Republican members of the House. 
Upon the third reading the Republicans refused to vote, 
whereupon the speaker directed the clerk to count as present 
those present but not voting, and a quorum being present, 
declared the bill passed upon this reading.10^
The reluctance of members to answer their quorum calls 
has not been restricted to the United States. In the French 
chamber of Deputies, where a majority is a quorum, it was 
decided in 1 8 7 8, by the President of the Country, that the 
presence only, and not the participation in the voting of 
a majority of: the members, is necessary for the validity of 
a vote.'10-*
Never-the-less, the House of Representatives failed to 
follow the quorum breaking of the states until 1 8 9 1. The 
scattered attempts to do so before the fifty-first Congress 
were over-ruled and real pressure for change did not start 
building until 1875• In that year a bill was called up and 
there arose dilatory proceedings including the quorum call 
and then refusal to vote. Mr. Benjamin F. Butlar, of 
Massachusetts, made the point that there was a quorum present, 
and if the Chair would take note of the presence of Mr. Samuel 
J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, who was participating in the 
proceedings, but had not voted, and of the Chair himself,
10^Ibid., p. 6 7 .
105-'Taul Mason, Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedure, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953), p. 341.
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,there would be a quorum present. John Coburn, representative
of Indiana, added that if a man is present but not voting,
one of his colleagues could vote for him. The strong reply
was made by James G. Blaine, the Speaker:
• The Chair never heard of that being done. He be^s 
to remind the House, whereas that might and doubtless 
would be true, that there is a quorum in the Hall, the 
very principle enunicated by the gentleman from Indiana 
has been the foundation probably for the greatest 
legislative frauds ever committed. Where a quorum,
I in the judgment of the Chair, has been declared to be
.!; present in the House against the result of a roll call,
these proceedings in the different legislatures have 
' brought scandal on their names. There can be no record 
’7 like the call of the yeas and nays; and from that there 
is no appeal. The moment you clothe your Speaker with 
power to go behind your roll call and assume that there 
is is a quorum in the Hall, why gentlemen, you stand 
on the very brink ’of a volcano.
Subsequent speakers were also reluctant to get near 
the brink of the volcano, for attempts during the next few 
years to end the silent quorum were futile. Perhaps the 
most ambitious attempt was made by John Randolph Tucker of 
Virginia in 1880. Tucker simply requested that the following 
amendment to the rules be adopted:
Whenever a quorum fails to vote on any question, 
and objection is made for that cause, there shall be 
a call of the House, and the yeas and nays on the pend­
ing question shall at the same time be ordered. The 
Clerk shall call the roll, and each member as he answers 
to his name, or is brought before the House under the 
proceedings of the call of the House, shall vote on the 
pending question. Of those voting on the question and 
decline to vote shall together make a majority of the1
U. S. Congressional Record, 43rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
Vol. 3, p. 1
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House, the Speaker shall declare that a quorum is con­
stituted; and the pending question shall be decided as 
the majority of those voting shall a p p e a r . 1 0 ?
Tucker was quick to offer explanation for this change in the
rules but the opposition was just as quick to condemn.
Tucker made the comparison between the House and the English
Commons where in the latter a quorum can be ascertained by
"ocular demonstration" but that such not the case in the
American House. He continued by pointing out that the,
"Constitution does not say that a majority voting shall
constitute a quorum, but that a majority of the House shall
constitute a quorum to do business." He concluded by
saying,
...it seems-to me not to be in accordance with the 
progress of the age we live in that we should sit 
there in a condition of nonaction under the self- 
delusion we are not present when we are present, and 
that there shall be a power on the part of gentlemen 
here upon any question of remaining silent and saying,
'you cannotnnrove I am here unless I choose to open
my mouth.
Several members of the house spoke against the adoption .
of the rule. Mr. Garfield was against giving one person the
power of declaring the presence of other members and charged
it would enable the speaker to,
...bring from his sick-bed a dying man and put him in ■
this Hall, so that the Speaker shall count him, and
make his presence against his will, and perhaps in his 
delirium, count in order to make a quorum, so that 
some partisan measure may be carried out over the
10?U. S. Congressional Record, 46th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
Vol. X, p. '57 $1*
lÔ Ibid.
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1 0 9body of that dying man.
Mr. Blackburn, while not quite so emotional,simply asked 
who would control the Speaker's seeing, and "how do we know 
but that he may see forty members more for his purposes than 
there are here in the House'*?-1--1-̂  A touch of irony was to 
come out of this verbal skirmish as Thomas B. Reed, in his 
logical way, added his condemnation to Tucker's rule. Several 
days later, Tucker withdrew? his amendment after Mr. Blackburn, 
head of the rules committee, let it beknown that his committee 
would bury the rule.
During the next three Congresses, there occurred only 
isolated instances of quorum obstruction and it proved to 
be more of a nuisance than a tool to pervert majority rule 
to impotency. The 50th Congress, however, was vicitimized 
by its own rules and its legislative output was meager and 
passage of the usual routine measures was secured only with 
the greatest difficulty. The quorum filibusters tended to 
make the body appear both odious and ridiculous in the eyes 
of the country. By the second session, the Speaker's 
situation was pitiable and Congress had demonstrated that the 
defects of the existing procedure were too deep-seated for any 
group of leaders to exercise adequate guidance and control
1Q9lbld.. p. 576. 
110Ibid.
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over the course of business. For Instance, James B. Weaver 
of Iowa, and a handful of sympathizers, held the House at 
bay for eight days by using the quorum or any other roll- 
call device that would waste the day.1^  For all practical
purposes the house had ceased to function as a legislative
I. -body. :j Only those bits of business that commanded an almost
unanimous consent were ever passed.
During the summer and autumn preceeding the Fifty-first
Congress, comments, articles and interviews with House
members pointed the way for an up-coming battle in the House.
Thomas B. Heed, the.Speaker elect, served notice that he
was going to attempt to change the rules, or as he stated:
I ought not to have written the words 'to change the 
rules,' for that conveys an entirely incorrect idea.
No rules have to be changed, for the new House will 
have no rules. What should have been written is that 
there will be an effort to establish rules which will 
facilitate the public business— rules unlike those of 
the present House, which only delay and frustrate 
action.
Roger Q. Mills, on the Democratic side, charged the Rep­
ublicans were bent on mischief and that,* «
they have some desperate enterprise on foot that their 
prophetic souls tell them Is beyond the boundary of 
rightful jurisdiction, and that in carrying it out 
they will meet with stubborn opposition.11^
The Democrats held the trump card in the silent quorum.
li:LIbid.
n ? Thomas B. Reed, "Obstruction in the National House", 
The North American Review, CXLIL (Oct., 1889), p. 427-^28.
113William A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed. Parliamentarian. 
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1930), p. 1 5 .
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The Republicans were a majority by eight, only three more 
than "a quorum, which was set at 1 6 5 . To make a quorum, the 
Republicans would be allowed only three absences, which 
would be impossible with sicknesses and unavoidable absence 
of members.
The session formally opened on December 2, 1 8 8 9* and 
the rules of the preceding Congress were referred to the 
Committee on rules for consideration and report. Speaker 
Reed utilized general parliamentary law while awaiting their 
report and the House moved slowly with routine matters.
Finally in the latter part of January, the House started 
deliberations on four contested Republican seats. On 
January 2 9, the West Virginia election case of Smith vs. 
Jackson was called up. The roll call gave yeas 162, nays 3, 
not voting 1 6 3, and on recapitulation, two Democrats with­
drew their votes, making the result yeas l6 l, hays 2 , not 
voting 1 6 5 * The Congressional Record tells the story of 
what happened next:
Mr. Crisp. No Quorum
The Speaker, The Chair directs the Clerk to record 
the names of members present and refusing to vote:
(Applause on the Republican side)
Mr. Crisp. I appeal— (applause on the Democratic side)
— I appeal from the decision of the Chair.
The Speaker. Mr. Blanchard. Mr. Bland. Mr. Blout.
Mr. Breckinridge, of Arkansas Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky.
Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky. I deny the power of the 
speaker and denounce it as revolutionary. (Applause' on 
the Democratic side of the House, which was renewed 
several times.)
Mr. Bland. Mr. Speaker— (Applause on the Democratic 
side.)
The Speaker. The House will be in order.
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Mr. Bland. Mr. Speaker, I am responsible to my 
constituents for the way in which I vote and not to the 
Speaker of this House (Applause.)
Mr. Speaker. Mr. Brookshire, Mr. Bullock, Mr. Bynum,
Mr. Carlisle, Mr. Chipman, Mr. Clements, Mr. Clunie,
Mr. Compton.
Mr. Compton. I protest against the conduct of the Chair 
in calling my name.
The Speaker (Proceeding). Mr. Covert, Mr. Crisp, Mr. 
Culverson of Texas (hisses on the Democratic side),
Mr. Cummings, Mr. Edmunds, Mr. Enloe, Mr. Pithian,
Mr. Goodnight, Mr. Hare, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. I appeal from any decision so far as I am 
concerned.
The Speaker (continuing). Mr. Holman, Mr. Lawler,
Mr. Lee, Mr. McAdoo, Mr. McCreary.
Mr. McCreary. I deny your right, Mr. Speaker, to count 
me as present, and I desire to read from the parliamentary 
law on that subject.
The Speaker. The Chair is making a statement of the 
fact that the gentlemen from Kentucky is present. Does 
he deny it? (Laughter and applause on the Republican 
side.)
The tumult continued with such remarks as:
Mr. Morgan. I beg leave to protest against this as 
unconstitutional and revolutionary...........
Mr. Outhwaite ('Cries of Regular Order.') I wish to 
state to the Chair that I was not present in the House 
when my name was called, and the Chair is therefore 
stating that is not ture. (Applause and cries of 'Orderi') 
It is not for the Chair to say whether I shall vote or 
not or whether I should answer to my name when it is 
called. (Laughter and applause.)' *
Mr. Crisp. I appeal from the decision—
Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky. It is disorderly; the 
House has ordered a vote and the Speaker has no more 
right to state that fact from the Speaker's chair than 
he would have from the floor of the House. It is a • 
disorderly proceeding on the part of the Speaker. 
(Applause on the Democratic side.)-1-1^
1 % .  s.. Congressional Records, 51st Cong., 1st Sess*, 
Vol. 21/ p. 9 %.
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Speaker Reed continued his count, paying little attention 
to the general pandemonium created by the members of the 
House. As he concluded the count and the confusion subsided, 
Reed offered his ruling and the reasons for it. He started 
by recalling John Randolph Tucker's efforts to eliminate 
the silent quorum, ten years earlier, mentioning also the 
problems with the quorum in Tennessee and reviewing the 
reasoning of David B. Hill in New York. His arguments were 
common-sense and not as elaborate as his subsequent published 
arguments. In essence, he maintained that the House had the 
constitutional power to compel attendance of members by the 
sergeant-at-arms and that such power was of no value if members 
; were present and yet refused to be counted as a quorum.
Reed said, "Inasmuch as the Constitution provides for their 
attendance only, that attendance is enough. If more was 
needed the Constitution would have provided for more."**^
Tumult even worse than before followed. Breckinridge of
Kentucky demanded a point of order and was overruled. He*
then appealed the decision of the Chair, but an alert 
Republican moved to take the appeal. Such a motion would, 
if carried, shut off debate; thus, the Democrates "foamed 
with rage" and the House saw behavior that has yet to be 
matched— including one Democrat who, unable to reach the 
front because of the crowded aisles, came down from the
^•^Hinds Precedents, ;.cp. cit., p. 6 7 .
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rear, leaping from desk to desk. Another member from Texas 
sat significantly whetting the bowie knife on his boot.
Tension broke briefly when Representative Spinola of New 
York, pointing to a picture of the siege of Yorktown on the 
wall, accused the Speaker of counting the Hessians in the
-j t ZT
background to make up his quorum. At each call of the
roll, Reed counted heads and repeated his formula, "A 
Constitutional quorum is present to do business," while all 
the time keeping control of himself, or as the New York 
Times said, "cool and determined as a highwayman."
Before the issue was settled, the House witnessed some 
great debate. Carlisle, Turner, Crisp for the Democrats 
and McKinley, Cannon, Butterworth and Reed for the Republicans. 
One of the ablest speeches of the debate was made by Butter- 
worth. He argued that a representative was chosen to serve 
not merely his own constituency but the whole country, and
fthat he had no warrent to attempt to paralyze the action of 
the House, but that the country had a right to require that 
he should be in his place and perform his duties. The consti­
tution had specifically given the House the power to compel 
attendance of its members. What was the object of this power?
Was this authority conferred by the Constitution 
only to enable us to go through the farce of bringing 
in the absentees and learning after each member has 
been seated in his place that, while under the 
Constitution he is actually personally present to make
ll6ruchman, op. cit.j p. 95*
8l
a quorum to do business, yet when an attempt is made 
to do the thing which required his presence, he at 
once by merely closing his mouth becomes constructively 
absent? Or he may, in fact, while present, arise in 
his place and assert that he is absent, : and we must take 
his word for it. What an absurdity on the face of it, 
no matter how sactified by agel It is the weapon of 
the revolutionist. It is the weapon of a n a r c h y . 1 ^
The Democrats attempted to absent themselves from the
House altogether but Reed was able to gather a quorum from
the ranks of the Republicans although it meant two members
brought in on their sickbeds. This occurred on the fifth
day and after the quorum was made the Democrats filed back
to their seats and the silent quorum was defeated. A few
weeks later the Rules Committee reported out a new set of
rules, composed by the Chairman— who was also Speaker of
the House. Known thereafter as "Reeds Rules" and adopted
on February 14, they provided among other things that (1)
all members must vote; (2) one hundred shall constitute a
quorum for a committee of the whole; (3) all present shall,
be counted; and (4) no dilatory motion shall be entertained
and the definition of what is dilatory is*to be left to the
liftjudgment of the Speaker.
The death cf the silent quorum reflected a profound 
alteration in the parliamentary procedure of the House.
However, it was not long before the Democrats attempted to
I
■^■^Samuel W. McCall, American Statesmen, Vol. 35:
Thomas B. Reed, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914). p. 170.
118Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower, (New York: 
MacMillan Co., 1966), p. 129.
nullify the quorum ruling and restore the weapon of the 
silent quorum. In 1892, the Democrats won control of the 
House by a large enough majority to gather a quorum without 
being dependent on the Republicans, whereupon they threw 
out Reed's reform. In the following Congress the Democrats 
were split on several basic issues and with reduced ranks, 
were unable always to procure a quorum. Reed was retired 
from the Speakership but was still in a position of strength 
as the leader of the Republicans on the floor. From this 
position Reed organized a filibuster and continually requested 
roll calls that held up the transaction of business on one 
occasion for two weeks. Finally the Democrats adopted a rule 
providing that a member who was present might be counted for 
the purpose of making a quorum, whether he voted or not.
Reed must have enjoyed a sweet revenge but refrained from 
crowing and instead simply said, "This scene here today is 
a more effective address than any I could make, I congratulate 
the Fifty-Third Congress".1-5-9
The quorum rules that Reed initiated and adopted by the 
Democrats were sustained in a decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United States. The case of U.S. v Ballin arose out 
of the act providing for the classification of worsteds, 
passed by the House on May 9* 1 8 9 0. On the vote there 
appeared yeas 1 3 8, nays 0, not voting 189* The Speaker
119Ibid., p. 130.
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then announced the names of 78 Members present and not 
voting, along with those who were, showed a total of 212 
Members present, constituting a quorum present to do business. 
The validity of this act was questioned and was carried as 
far as the Supreme: .Court. The following paragraph gives the 
substance of the court's decision:
As appears from the Journal at the time this bill 
passed the House, there was present a majority, a quorum, 
and the House was authorized to transact any and all 
business. It was in a condition to act on the bill if 
it desired. The other branch of the question is whether, 
a quorum being present, the bill received a sufficient 
number of votes; and here the general rule of all parl­
iamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the 
act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body.^20
The effect of Reed's modification of the quorum and the
Supreme Court concurrence has rendered the quorum a limited
tool of obstruction. It can however, be used to accomplish
other ends that amount to obstruction. For instance during
the 1964 civil rights bill debate, the Southern members of
the Senate were staging a filibuster. Each day, Senators
Humphrey, and Kuchel, the bill's floor managers, wrote let-
f,
ters to Northern Senators exhorting them to be on hand to 
answer quorum calls. The Southern strategy was to keep 
demanding roll calls in order to prolong the filibuster.
If a quorum failed to answer the roll, the Southerners could 
adjourn for the day and rest up for the next day's filibuster. 
When the Northerners failed to raise a quorum on April 4,
•^^United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1.
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Senate. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, called this, "a
1?1travesty on the legislative process,1
Modern American usage of the quorum. Aside from quorum 
obstructionism, another facet of the quorum that has been
C
troublesome to organizational bodies has been the question
of just what constitutes a quorum. Chapter one cites several
definitions of the quorum that are offered in selected
parliamentary procedure textbooks. All are very general and
are open to the types of questions that follow the definitions,
"Supra, p. 1 6, 1 7".
Once again, the House of Representatives furnishes an
excellent opportunity for the development of procedure to
be traced in respect to this aspect of procedure. The
constitution states that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum. In the absence of a set number, court
decisions have established the majority to be the legal 
122quorum number. In the House the question emerged 
under the Speakership of Galusha A. Grow, as to just what 
precisely constitutes a quorum. In l86l, Vallandigham of 
Ohio, made a point of order that no House existed since the 
Chair had counted a quorum on the basis of a majority of
^ %?he Humboldt Times, June 23, 1966, p. 4.
1 PPMasson in his book on Legislative procedure has 
indexed the cases in detail that substantiate the majority 
as the quorum. See particularly Brown v Dist. of Columbia 
(1888), 127, U.S. 579, 32L. Ed. 262. Masson, op. cit., p. 336.
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members chosen, not on the basis of those sworn in. The 
reasons for such a request probably stem from the fact that 
at the beginning of the Civil War a large number of con­
stituencies refused to elect, thus it was practically impossible 
to secure the attendance of a majority of all possible members* 
The speaker responded by quoting the constitution, "The 
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen 
every second year by the people of the several States." 
Vallandigham did not elect to argue the point and the house 
acquiesced in the decision.•L23
There was no further discussion over the question of 
what constituted a quorum of the house until 1 8 7 9, when 
Speaker Randall from Maine, concluded that although there 
was a majority of the House present a true quorum could be 
fewer, to account for the fact that there were two vacancies. 
Whether Randall was correct to conclude two fewer for a quorum 
because of the vacancies was not challenged, hence no decision.
The question was brought up again on May 10, 1886 when
*
Speaker Carlisle stated that'it was an open question "as
to whether or not it requires a majority of all members who
might be elected under the law to the House to constitute
a quorum or merely a majority of those who are Members of 
i plxthe House." The matter was left at this point until
123Hinds, op. cit., p. 60 
12^Ibid.
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September, I8 9 0. Thomas B. Reed was Speaker. Charles
Crisp of Georgia made the point that no quorum was present
since the quorum count had excluded four vacancies. Reed
had to decide whether 164 members were a quorum or, counting
the four vacancies, 166 was the legal quorum. In his decision,
which reviewed the previous decisions on the matter, Reed
concluded that the words, "those chosen" meant members chosen
then alive, thus 164 would be the proper number.
But Reed's decision still did not go far enough and in
1906 it was necessary to re-define what constituted a proper
quorum. In the decision of that year, Speaker Cannon of
Illinois turned to a Senate Committee report which stated
a quorum was a majority duly chosen and sworn. For the
purposes of the House, he added that a quorum consists of
a "majority of those members chosen, sworn, and living,
whose membership has not been terminated by resignation or
by the action of the House." Speaker Cannon's ruling of
125April 16, 1906, is still regarded as the correct inter-
1
pretation of the phrase in the constitution that states,
"a majority of each (House) shall constitute a quorum to do 
business," and continues to be regarded as the definitive 
ruling on this point.
Since Speaker Cannon's ruling, the question has rarelyi
j
125u . S., Congressional Record, 59th Cong. 1st Sess.,
1 9 0 6, p. 5354.
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been the subject of floor discussion and frequent reafferma- 
tions^ of the ruling by the Chair have not been required. 
However, on May 9, 1913* Speaker Clark, in response to a 
point of order that 216 members did not constitute a quorum, 
stated, "Two hundred and sixteen Members constitute a quorum. 
Four hundred and thirty-four Members constitute the whole 
membership of the House, but one is dead and three have never 
been sworn in."12^ The matter has been left at this and 
no new efforts at defining the quorum requirement of the 
constitution have been attempted.
Many decisions and acts that have been passed by Legis­
lative bodies, corporations, boards and private groups etc., 
have been challenged and tested in light of their procedural 
legality. As a result, rules from the House of Representatives 
as well as other organizations, have had their legality 
tested in the courts of law for over the past one hundred 
years and there now exists a series of legal cases that
define and limit the quorum concept. The following, from
127Words and Phrases, ' cover the general usage of the quorum 
as evolved by the courts:
A majority always constitutes a 'quorum,' of a 
deliberative body, in absence of some legal requirement 
fixing different number, and can take any action within 
power of body to transact. Herring v. City of Mexia,
Tex.,
126U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 1457.
127"Quorum," Words and Phrases, Vol. 35A.
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The general rule applicable to boards, commissions 
and similar bodies or entities of a definite membership 
applies to a building commission appointed to build 
county buildings unless the statute otherwise specifi­
cally provides, to-wit, that a 'quorum' consists of 
a majority of its members, and that such 'quorum' 
due notice having been given to the time and place 
of meeting of all members, can exercise the powers 
of the commission: and further, that action of a
majority of such 'quorum' is the action of the body 
or commission. State ex rel. Green v. Edmondson,
23 Ohio Dec. 8 6 , 9 6 , 12 Ohio N.P., N.S., 5 7 7, 588.
Under generally accepted Rules of Parliamentary 
Procedure, in absence of contrary provision, a 
majority of authorized membership of a body, 
consisting of a definite number of members, constitutes 
a 'quorum' for the purpose of transaction business. 
McCormick v. Board of Ed. of Hobbs Municipal School
Dist. No. 16,. 274 P2d 299, 308, 58 N.M. 648.
In actions to have office of county manager of 
Florence county declared vacant, to restrain hold­
over officer from continuing to exercise duties thereof, 
and to compel him to turn over office to alleged new 
appointee, where there was a consistent tie on every’ 
ballot of governing board of Florence county seeking 
to elect county manager and three members withdrew 
from meeting after 5 o'clock and remaining three ' 
members unanimously voted for county manager, evidence 
sustained finding that at the time of attempted 
election there was no 'quorum', essential to valid
election. Gaskins v. Jones, 18 S.E. 2d 454, 456, 457,
19 8, s.c. 5 0 8 .
Where by-laws of corporation required that four 
be a quorum at directors meeting, but, at meetings where 
bonuses were voted to majority stockholder who was 
dominating director, only four directors including 
the dominating director were present, there was no 
'quorum', meetings were illegal, and bonuses were 
mere 'gratuities', especially where notice of such 
meetings was not given. In re Fergus Falls Woolen 
Mills Co., D. C. Minn., 4l F. Supp. 355, 3 6 2.
'Quorum'-* within corporate bylaw providing that 
majority of directors shall constitute quorum meant 
majority of remaining directors, not majority of total 
authorized number of directors, and two of remaining 
three directors could elect individual to fill vacancy 
where third remaining director and refused to attend
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election meeting and other bylaws provided for vote 
of majority of 'whole board' and three-fourths of 
'whole board1 where serious action was involved.
Gearing v. Kelly, 222 N. Y. S. 2d 474, 476, 15 
A.D. 2d 219.
Under const, art 6 , SS 5* 8 , Rev. St. 1 9 0 8, SS1412, 
a majority of the members of the Supreme Court constitute 
the court en banc, and a majority of the court as thus 
constituted may decide a case, three judges at least 
concurring; a 'quorum,' as used in the statute, meaning 
a majority of the entire body. Mountain States Telephone 
& Telegraph Co. v. People 190 P. 5 1 3, 517, 6 8, Colo. 487.
As used in Const, art. 6SS2, par. 1, providing 
that the Court of Errors and Appeals shall consist 
of the chancellor, the justices of the supreme court, 
and six judges, or a major part of them, the words 
'a major part of them' do not refer merely to the 
six judges, but refer back to all of the antecedents 
and mean that a majority of the entire court, including 
the chancellor, the justices, and the six judges, shall 
constitute a 'quorum' being sufficient to render a 
decision. In re Hudson County, 144 A. 16 9, 171, 106 
N.J. Law, 62.
A 'quorum' of grand jury means that at least 12 
grand jurors were present. People v. Dale, 179 P.
2d 8 7 0, 8 7 2, 79 CA2d 3 7 0 .
It is now well settled that in all cases the 
majority of a legislative body is a quorum entitled 
to act for the whole body, unless the power that 
creates it has otherwise directed. Zeller v. Central 
'R. Co . 35 A. 9 3 2, 9 3 4, 84 MD. 304, 34 LRA 4 6 9 .
Lastly, the method of computing a quorum should be 
noted. The following example by Sturgis is a method that 
meets legal requirements and is in general use by private 
organizations and in many cases, official and legislative 
bodies. In computing a quorum, only members in good 
standing are counted. The quorum of an organization with 
a membership list of 262 members and a required quorum of
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one-sixth of its members would be computed as follows:
Total membership list ............. ...262
Delinquent members.............   12
Members in good standing.............. 250
Number required for quorum............ 42
Since a quorum always refers to the number of members
present and not to the number voting, in the example just
cited, if only 25 voted on a question, the vote would still
be legal provided there was present a quorum of 4-2 or more
members in good standing. A member who is disqualified
because of personal benefit or interest in a particular
question cannot be counted for the purpose of computing a
quorum for a vote on that question or of counting a majority 
128of the quorum. The presiding officer, if he is a 
member of the organization, is counted in computing a 
q u o r u m . ^30
■^^Enright v. Heckscher (1917) 240 Fed. 8 6l, 153 
C.C.A. 5497
129shugars v. Hamilton (1906) 122 Dy. 6 0 6, 92 S.W. 564
•^^Alice F. Sturgis, Standard Code of Parliamentary 
Procedure, (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1 9 5 0 ) ,  P* 15•
II. PHILOSOPHY OP THE QUORUM
Parliamentary procedure is a state of mind as much as 
a system of maintaining order. Take away the attitude and 
desire for order and progress In conducting the business 
of an organizational body and chaos will ensue. Like all 
of man's law, parliamentary procedure requires an affirmative 
attitude for orderly group action to transpire. Strip away 
the affirmative attitude and only the mechanical rules 
remain; these rules are Inadequate by 'themselves.
Wilkenson Gray has constructed a set of principles under
which true and effective parliamentary procedure must work.
The first principle and perhaps most Important is that the
group, as a whole, has the right to determine its own course
of action. The device which is used to determine which
course of action a group may follow is often discussed,
namely' the use of boting or balloting, but these devices
rely on more basic, seldom considered principles. This*
basic and fundamental aspect of democratic boting and 
decision making is the concept of a majority and minority; 
or, the concept that the greater part of a voting body 
determines the will of the whole. In fact, the concept of
^•Wilkenson Gray, "Philosophy of Parliamentary Law", 
Quarterly Journal of Speech. (October, 19^1)* p. ^37.
92
a minority with rights that will acquiesce to the will of 
the majority as if it had been their own, "is an invention 
no less definite than that of the lever or wheel, and is 
found for the first time as an every day method of decision 
in Greek political life."2
The exact moment or place of the first instance of 
majority rule will probably never be known but one obvious 
answer is simply that the side with the greater strength 
or number of swords would have its will prevail. In any 
event, majority rules emerged in ancient Greece as a standard 
method of policy making. Since then, in many and various 
societies the majority rule concept has been maintained as 
a method of decision making and in modern democracies is a 
fundamental rule.
There are, of course, those political systems that 
in both theory and practice repudiate the idea of majority 
rule as well as minority existence. For Instance, in theory 
Thomas Hobbes-^ held that government, when instituted, was 
neoessarily to have absolute power, and not necessary to 
consider 'the rights of minority or even of a majority of
subjects, as opposed to the will of the man, or assembly of
' ̂ Umen, to* whom was given the sovereign authority.
2Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the 
State. (London: MacMillan and Oo., I925)t P» '4.
^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (London: Andrew Crooke,
1651), p. 115.
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In practice we need but look to modern day communism, I.e.,' 
Red China to find an example where no discernible effort is 
made to allow the majority to rule, or minority protection 
to exist outside the power e l i t e . M o s t  western governments 
that are democratic in design are in part considered dem­
ocratic because rule is by majority and those in power 
attempt to protect the minority— often referred to as the 
"loyal opposition".
Thus, in the development of parliamentary procedure the 
concept of majority rule and minority acquiescence and 
protection are basic. A government or ruling body that 
does not allow majority rule and minority protection cannot 
be considered truly democratic in the usual sense of the 
word. Pirther, a government may be ruled by majority but unless 
.the minority is protected, a realistic form of free government 
cannot exist. It is minority protection, or rights beyond 
the reach of the majority which constitute liberty, not the 
: power of the majority.-^
$Under a democratic government that professes rule by
Hobbes neglects to explain Just how differences of 
opinion between members of the assembly or sovereign and assembly 
were to be resolved
^aPeter S. H. Tanz, Communist China Today, (New York* 
Praegor, Inc., Pub., 1957)» P« 17&.
^Francis Lleber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 
(Philadelphia* J.B. Lippincott & Co., 18$3), p. 31*
9b
the majority, two conditions concerning the minor!ty- 
majority concept may develop which contain evils of such 
magnitude as to possibly corrupt the system. First, on 
initial impression what appears to be rule by majority may 
in fact be quite the opposite; in reality an organized 
minority may impose its will on a disorganized majority.
The will of the people practically means the will of the 
most numerous or the most active part of the people, the 
majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted 
as the majority.** This same trend can easily occur outside 
the framework of national governments as any public or 
private organization can be ruled by a genuine majority or 
suffer from a minority that dictates to the majority in the 
name of majority rule. In practical life, there exist classes
i .or blocs which do the ruling. The management of public 
affairs and private, organization business, or policy 
direction is generally in the hands of a minority of in­
fluential persons, to which the majority will defer:.'.
Concern for this very problem led the authors of the 
Federalist Papers to warn the new nation of America to 
be aware of a powerful minority since,
It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater 
the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the 
men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In the 
first place, the more numerous an assembly may be, of 
whatever characters composed, the greater is known to
**Bosanquet, op. cit.. p. 7 0 .
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be the ascendancy of passion over reason. In the next 
place, the larger the number, the greater will be the 
prpportlon of members of limited information and of 
weak capacities.'
Secondly, and of less Immediate consequence to parliamentary
procedure, is the condition known as the majority tyranny.
Many thinkers have considered the problem but it was Tocquevllle,
the early observer of America, who made sobering comments on
the emraanent tendencies toward majority despotism in America.
He prophesied that:
1'. If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, 
that event may be attributed to the unlimited authority 
: of the majority, which may at some future time urge the 
| minorities to desperation, and oblige them to have 
!I recourse to physical force. Anarchy will then be the „ 
[result, but it will have been brought about by despotism.
The America of 1830’s was the subject of Tocquevllle's concern
and now almost 150 years later, the tyranny of the majority
is still a potential threat.
Hamilton and Madison were aware of the latent dangers
' r
of a large legislature and in the Federalist Papers warned
...the more multitudinous a representative assembly 
may be rendered, the more it will partake of the 
infirmities Incident to collective meetings of the 
people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, 
and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.
The people can never err more than in supposing that 
by multiplying their representative beyond a certain
^Alex. Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The 
Federalist or the New Constitution, (London: J.M. Dent,
1911). P. 300.,
a°Alexis de Tocquevllle, Democracy in America. Trans, 
Henry Reeve, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
190*0, Vol. I., p. 287.
limit, they strengthen the barrier against the 
government of a f e w . 9
Parliamentary procedure is constructed on the concept 
of rule by the majority— howeverr imperfect this may be or 
whatever be the built-in problems or propensity for abuse.
Within the framework of procedure the concept of the quorum 
requirement has been devised. There are several immediate 
and easily discernible reasons for a quorum.
First it can be utilized to force a degree of attendance. 
It is somewhat of a paradox that the history of freedom of 
government and the establishment of democracy has been the 
fight to insure the right of all persons to have a voice 
in their government; yet, frequently legislative organizations 
are hard put to devise methods of forcing their members to 
attend and do the work required to maintain representative 
government. To represent one's community or organization 
is considered a privilege but such has not always been the 
case. For instance in medieval England, where the concept 
of representation was beginning to develop, Pollard noted 
that,
The difficulty was to enforce the attendance of rep­
resentatives, medieval "liberties" were nearly fatal to 
representation and to the county courts, for the most 
cherished liberty was that which excused the lords and 
his tenants... 0
^Haml1ton, loc. cit. 
10Pollard, op. cit.. p. 109.
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It has been noted elsewhere in this paper the 
attendance problem that preceded the adoption of a quorum 
requirement in the house of commons In 1640. The quorum 
requirement may have eased the problem of a thin house, but 
far from solved it. Forty is a small number when the total 
of the house for over three hundred years has been over 
five hundred members. Yet not' always was this simple quorum 
number easy to come by. In the House it was enacted in 
1 6 7 8, thirty-eight years after the quorum requirement, that, "
"...absentees should be fined 40L, and if they refused to
11pay the fine, then to be committed to the tower." In 
1693 the speaker was direoted to write letters to the sheriffs 
of respective counties, requesting they send back errant 
members of the house. The non-attendanoe of members in the 
House is cause for concern but sometimes the reason is 
comic, as when no House could be formed to discuss the rival 
claims of the old and new East India Company— the members 
had dispersed to see a tiger baited by dogs.1** por the 
House of Commons, the quorum number Is small and is 
inadequate to offer but a minimum assist in developing a 
House of at least fifty percent of the members. Yet, attempts 
to change the quorum were few and readily defeated.
1 1A W. C. Townsend, History of the House of Commons from 
1688 to 1832. (London* 1843, Vol. II), p. 3 6 6 .
1 2Ibld.
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There are certain pragmatic considerations that should
I : 'be noted in regards to small attendance. In the House of
Commons, the American Congress or any private or. government
group, optimum efficiency of procedure does not necessarily
occur with full attendance. In fact, most organizations do
operate better with a small number in attendance. But here
the problem of a minority control again becomes a concern;
hence, here must be in attendance enough of the membership
to Insure diversity of views and discussion. Moreover, the
larger, a legislative body is made, the more difficult it
becomes for the members to combine successfully for purposes
recognized as improper. Or as Sidgwich stated,
...the enlargement of the assembly beyond a certain 
point tends to give undue advantage in debate to the 
less valuable qualifications for oratory, and makes 
its meetings more liable to lapse into confusion, 
impulsiveness, and intemperance of a mob; and it 
Involves the further drawback that the members have 
greater difficulty in obtaining useful personal 
knowledge of each other.
An even stronger argument can be found in the Federalist
Papers t
...In all cases where justice or the general good 
might require new laws to be passed, or active measures 
to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free 
government would be reversed. It would be no longer the 
majority that would rule; the power would be transferred 
to the minority.1^
•'•̂ Henry Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics. (London* 
MacMillan and Co., 1897), p. 4o6,
■^Hamilton, loc. cit.
'• i
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Secondly, the quorum can protect the majority or a
large number of a body from an unusually small number of
members who might attempt to proceed with business favorable
only to those present. In theory, as Cushing points out,
the condition of fewer than the total membership doing
business is not really possible under the strictest adherence
to parliamentary practice,
...where authority is conferred upon several persons, 
to be excercised with others all the persons authorized 
must be present in order to excercise it, and that 
authority delegated to the discretion of an individual, 
cannot be delegated by him to another.
The strict adherence to this rule would be cumbersome if not
impossible; hence, exception Is made and only a specified
number or quorum need be present. The question quickly
arises, as to Just what is a proper quorum number. Some
organizations use a set number, some use a percentage,, Most
organizations, particularly governmental legislatures, have
a set number that is specified by the organization^ constitution.
How this number is computed or determined is considered in
another chapter.
■The selection of a quorum number can be quite a oap- 
riclous thing with each organization attempting to meet
its particular needs. It has been noted that the English
»■
^Cushing, pp. pit., p. 9^.
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House of Commons requires forty to form a quorum; the United 
States House of Representatives requires a majority of those 
present and voting as do most state governments. Over twenty 
use the same words that the United States Constitutibnii does* 
"a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do 
business.” Some state houses require two-thirds including 
Illinois, Tennessee, Indiana, etc. In New Hampshire seven 
members of the senate make a quorum; in Massachusetts not less 
than sixteen for the senate and not less than sixty for the 
house. In all, most states simply call for a majority and 
private organizations that meet regularly in one geographic 
area do the same. For national organizations with large 
memberships a small percentage is generally required.
But what is the logic that can allow twenty members of 
a group, as in the English house, the power so speak in the 
name of 670 members, or if a majority as in the United States 
House, 119 members binding 435 as if all had assented to 
the enactment? Parliamentary procedure allows most motions 
to pass with a majority of affirmative votes but with a 
quorum of a majority, the majority of the majority may 
legally proceed with business in the name of the entire 
body. Thus, with the quorum at a majority, 25 percent is 
needed for the transaction of business.^ With the quorum
-*-^Cushing points out how even the small number of 
forty has been stretched on occasion in the commons. The
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number smaller, a corresponding smaller portion of the 
membership constitutes a quorum. Serious doubts can be 
raised about a system that allows such a small number to 
speak for the entire body, particularly in the name of majority 
protection. Another problem of quorum usage that may harm 
the majority is a result of a quorum requirement that is too 
high or when adequate attendance is a problem. What might 
occur is the power might shift from the majority to thei
minority, since without minority attendance there can be no 
business accomplished. Hypothetioally, it is possible for 
one single member to veto any bill if the quorum is formed 
by only one more than the required quorum number, for without 
his vote or attendance no quorum is present. This amounts to 
a potential club over the head of an organization and can be
used by the minority to dictate its will on the entire
)
group. Hardly does such a situation maintain accord with 
fairness and majority will. In his commentaries on the 
constitution, Joseph Story considered the problem of the 
majority Quorum and stated,
 If such a course were generally allowed, it might be
extremely prejudicial to the public interests in cases, 
with required new laws to be passed, or old ones 
modified, to preserve the general, in contradistinction 
to the local or special interests. If it were even
Instance was a house divided, Mtwenty-seven ayes and eight nays, 
the aggreate of which, with the two tellers on each side and the 
ppeaker, just made up a quorum, the question was thereby held 
deoided.'* Ibid.. p. 122.
102
confined to particular cases, the privilege might 
enable an interested minority to screen themselves 
from equitable sacrifices to the general weal;, or in 
particular cases, to extort undue indulgences. '
Whether the minority elects to make "equitable sacrifices”
or "extort undue indulgences" is a moot point as this
situation is wholly in violation of the principles of
procedure that maintains the majority will, shall prevail.
If the use of the quorum for purposes of forcing
attendance and protection of the majority are legitimate
uses of the quorum, there are other and less noble uses to
which the device may be put. Champ Clark, after 25 years in
the House of Representatives, part of those as Speaker, observed
many of the diverse possibilities of the quorum:
...to defeat a bill which some member deems obnoxious, 
...because some one is angered by the proponents of 
a bill,;.*because some member who is not opposed to 
the pending bill wants to kill time so that some other 
bill to which he is opposed cannot be considered,
...because of a desire for revenge for the recent de­
feat of his own pet measure,...because he desires to 
annoy somebody else or to show his power,...because 
he is weary or hungry or has an engagement or thinks 
the House has sat long enough, and hopes by^raising the 
point of no quorum to force an adjournment.
At best such uses of the quorum could only be considered
dilatory, but never-the-less under the right circumstances
such ends could be realized with the use of the quorum.
^^Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States, (5th ed.; New York: Little Brown & Co.,
1891), Sec. 35.
18Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics. 
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1920), Vol. I, p. 199.
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Champ Clark may have had tongue In cheek when he listed 
. the above, but there can be no doubt as to the truth involved. 
• All of which points to the question as to how far can the 
quorum— or any parliamentary device— be perverted to gain 
ends that are unrelated to initial pruposes? In the case of 
the quorum, the opportunities have been numerous.
/
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- I SUMMARY
' 'I' . •The purpose of this study was twofold* to discover a 
history of the quorum and to discover a philosophy of the 
quorum as It is used as a function or device of parliament­
ary procedure. Tne study was primarily aimed at events in 
American political history but traced the origins and usages 
of the quorum from its fragmentary beginnings in medieval 
English parliaments to its development as a standard prac­
tice of parliamentary law.
The study revealed that a form or concept of the quorum 
was utilized as early as the 12th century during the germ­
ination period of the English parliament. The concept is 
stated by the label "quorum" in 1327 and linked with the 
development of the office of the justice of the peace. The
<5
quorum was adopted as a constant rule of procedure in I6*f0 
by the English House of Commons. Its function at that time 
appears as^an effort to force attendance.
A quorum requirement was consistantly imposed by the 
English monarch in the charters granted to the various Amer­
ican colonies— of ten in an attempt to maintain a form of 
political control. The use of the Quorum device was wide-
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■ spread In state legislatures and by the time of the constitu­
tional convention of 1887 it was an item of concern for the 
. framers of the new constitution. Despite certain objections 
the quorum in both houses was set at a majority, paving the 
way for the utilization of the quorum as a device of par- 
; liamentary obstruction.
On occasion the quorum had been used as a device of 
obstruction in the House of Commons but the optimum condi­
tion for stifling parliamentary business was not realized 
■until John Q. Adams refused to answer the quorum call in 
. 183^ in the American House of Representatives. Although 
this practice had been used in legislative bodies before, 
Adams brought it into respectability. The practice became 
known as the silent or disappearing quorum. Once estab­
lished the silent quorum was used in many state legislatures. 
Its continued use to obstruct reached intolerable limits in 
the 50th United States Congress. Thomss B. Reed, the Speaker 
of the 51st Congress, faced the issue and was successful in 
breaking the silent quorum. His parliamentary revision of 
quorum usage was upheld by the Supreme Court.
Finally, the study discussed assumptions which must be 
present to provide a realistic use of the quorum. Such 
assumptions included a system of democratic voting and I
decision making based on the concepts of majority rule and 
minority acqulesence and protection. The study of the phllos
ophy of the quorum revealed the intensity and extent to which
" '•! ' ’
' V . I-; s'
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men will struggle to attain a realistic form of group man­
agement for deliberative bodies— of which the foremost goal 
of the quorum has been to secure a more fair system of 
democratic representation and action to insure the rights 
of all persons.
II RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE QUORUM USAGES
One of the more pressing problems related to parliamen­
tary procedure today is the inability of organizations to update 
or reform their own methods of doing business. As organizations, 
and particularly legislative branches of government, travel their 
evolutionary path, discarding old duties and responsibilities 
while adding new ones, they tend to continue to utilize the 
same procedure. When viewed in terms of decades and centuries, 
certain practices become quite antiquated and should be discarded. 
It is important that organizations be aware of the need to 
review the mechanics of their procedure and fit it to the 
organization's real needs. Such is particularly the case with 
legislative branches of government where rules committees continue 
to add but rarely subtract or synthesize their practices. In 
this age of advanced technology, when the magic of the computer 
is becoming commonplace, organizations would do well to consider 
how they might gain from the utilization of mechanical devices
to speed their procedure.
I:,Tn specific respect to the quorum as a function 'of
-
y . . Jl” A:,-;
• • ,  , : ; j j  /  j } ; . •
parliamentary procedure, the results of this investigation in , 
indicate that many organizations should review their quorum 
requirement in light of the following recommendations for 
future quorum usages.
First, organizations ^without a specific need should 
eliminate the quorum requirement— subject to the implementation 
of certain safeguards. In this era of rapid communications 
there should be no quorum requirement for the opening or 
continuance of business. The ease by which information can 
be transmitted, received and recorded with electronic devices 
allows sufficient communication between members of organizations 
without each others physical presence. However the following, 
in whole or part, should be used when a specific quorum is not 
required*
1. Calendars set up for work periods, sessions, etc. and
distributed to all members or units;
2. Printed agendas submitted to all members at a set
time before each scheduled meeting*
3. A majority decision to be considered valid regardless 
of the proportion of the whole voting, provided that if the 
decision is challenged it will be considered at a fixed timed 
at the next regular meeting period of the organization and 
shall then be decided without debate by a majority of those 
voting* ; 1
Second, when an organization elects to require a quorum
number for the transaction of business, the following are 
RecommendedI
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1. The quorum requirement should emanate from a con­
stitution in order to prevent easy access to a potential 
device of obstructionism. Further, this makes it difficult 
for the executive to gain undue control over the legislative 
by preventing executive attempts to reduce the quorum and thus 
gaining undue persuasion and advantagei
2* Recognition by the chair that when a quorum does not 
exist it is his duty to so notice and take appropriate action 
within the framework of the organization^ constitution. When 
a quorum is assumed when one is not present, the situation is 
contrary to fact and at best an ostrich-like approach:
3* The quorum requirement should not be used as a device 
to force attendance, as in early English Parliaments, since 
such a practice creates the potential for new, additional 
problems. A new system should be utilized to force attendance—  
if it need be forced at alii •
A high quorum number should be selected by an organi­
zation whose structure includes a strong executive, i.e., broad
' i  *;.• :
powers given to a president, mayor, etc. Such a number will 
reduce the possibility of executive attempts to manipulate a
! 'j
select few members to form a quorum to do the executive's^ 
or anyone else’s special projects:
- i 'i 5» Each organization should enact rules-that call for the 
reading of bills, taking of votes, etc., only on given days or 
meetings in a regular sequence.
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6. Members should be required to answer quorum calls if 
physically present, or suffer official reprimand and deemed in 
contempt, or possibly fined:
7. For legislative bodies without strong executives, as 
opposed to private,^single purpose groups, the quorum number 
should be low— at least less than a majority, to allow for the 
multiplicity of legislative business. There are many aspects 
of business which a fairly small portion of the whole can 
handle with dispatch while being fully accountable to total 
membership. Redress of any alleged wrongs could be considered 
by opening debate:
8. Any large organization and particularly legislatures of 
civil governments should use electronic devices to speed quorum: 
counts.
The above are listed in hopes that the quorum, or lack 
of one, will in the future be a device to speed parliamentary 
procedure, and assist in ending the problems historically 
associated with it.
1 III RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
1 !
This study has been limited to one rule (or device) 
of parliamentary procedure and makes no attempt to investi­
gate the numerous other devices which form the corpus of rules 
known as parliamentary procedure. In fact, there is little 
evidence to suggest that parliamentary procedure has been 
the target of a great deal of historical study at any time.
This absence forms the justification of additional studies
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Into the developments and philosophies of parliamentary 
procedures.
The past two thousand years have seen continual growth 
of regulations imposed bit by bit or in bulk, as in the case of 
legislative bodies that underwent major reform acts resulting 
in fundamental changes and additions to procedure. There is 
a need then, not only to probe deeper into aspects of the 
quorum but to trace historically the many faceted devices of 
procedure from their earliest appearances, through their adop­
tion and modification, to the final stage of common usage.
Specifically then, there is a need for additional 
studies into the growth of rules and philosophies of parlia­
mentary devices in order to one day form a basis of a 
comprehensive history of parliamentary procedure. Further, 
a need exists for investigations into the status of present 
day parliamentary procedure to determine comparative relation­
ships between major private and public legislative bodies of 
.the world*
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